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I. INTRODUCTION1

One morning in April 2015, a father walked into his threeyear-old son’s room, probably expecting to hear the sounds of his
son talking or playing, or other “ordinary” household sounds.2
Instead, the child’s father heard an adult male voice come
through the baby monitor, saying “Wake up little boy, daddy’s
looking for you.”3 On other occasions, the child’s father had
heard the voice on the monitor say, “Look someone’s coming,”
and “Someone’s coming into view.”4 The family later determined
that the baby monitor had been remotely hacked by a stranger,
which also allowed the individual to control the camera on the
baby monitor, therefore allowing the hacker to spy on the

1. The title of this article is a reference to E.M. Forster’s 1909 science
fiction novella, THE MACHINE STOPS, which depicts a dystopian world where all
the needs of individuals are provided by the omnipotent, global “Machine.” E.M.
FORSTER, THE MACHINE STOPS (1909), http://archive.ncsa.illinois.edu
/prajlich/forster.html. Portions of this article include material adapted from
“Global Privacy and Data Protection,” a chapter published in the course
handbook for the Practising Law Institute’s (PLI) COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 2017 conference held November 9-10, 2017. The author of the
chapter, Prof. Jane Kirtley, granted to PLI non-exclusive rights to publish the
chapter in COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, retaining the right
to republish the contents elsewhere. JEFFREY P. CUNARD ET AL., PRACTISING L.
INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017 (2017).
2. Crimesider Staff, Baby Monitor Hacker Delivers Creepy Message to
Child, CBS NEWS (April 23, 2015, 9:08 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/baby-monitor-hacker-delivers-creepy-message-to-child/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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family.5 Two years earlier, a family in Texas reported very
similar events: a hacker had been spying on and speaking to
their two-year-old daughter.6 The hackers were able to do so
because the baby monitors were connected to the internet and a
smart phone app that allows parents to monitor their child.7
Baby monitors are one of numerous devices that are part of
the Internet of Things (IoT), a network of “smart” devices that
can connect to the internet. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) defines the IoT as “devices or sensors – other than
computers, smartphones, or tablets – that connect, communicate
or transmit information with or between each other through the
Internet,” creating a network.8 These devices or sensors are
increasingly sold commercially to consumers, but can also be
“sold in a business-to-business context, such as sensors in hotel
or airport networks.”9 The IoT can also encompass “broader
machine-to-machine communications that enable businesses to
track inventory, functionality, or efficiency.”10 Examples of IoT
devices include smart cars, home appliances, thermostats,
wearable devices, medical devices, and more.11
5. Id.; see also Yael Grauer, Security News This Week: Turns Out Baby
Monitors Are Wildly Easy to Hack, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/09/security-news-week-turns-baby-monitorswildly-easy-hack/ (“When security firm Rapid 7 tested nine widely available
internet-connected baby monitors for security vulnerabilities, the results
weren’t pretty. ‘Eight of the nine cameras got an F and one got a D minus,’
security researcher Mark Stanislav told Fusion’s Kashmir Hill.”).
6. Ryan Grenoble, Hacked Baby Monitor Caught Spying On 2-Year-Old
Girl in Texas (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/hacked-baby-monitor-houston-texasparents_n_3750675.html; see also Jessica Willey, Hacker Targets Houston
Family’s Baby Monitor, ABC 13 (Aug. 13, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://abc13.com
/archive/9201651/.
7. Seen at 11: Cyber Spies Could Target Your Child Through a Baby
Monitor, CBS N.Y. (April 21, 2015, 11:28 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015
/04/21/seen-at-11-cyber-spies-could-target-your-child-through-a-baby-monitor/.
8. Jane E. Kirtley, Global Privacy and Data Protection–2015, in 1
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2015, at 655,
674 (2015); FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS:
PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2015), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Andrew Meola, Internet of Things: Devices, Applications & Examples,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/internet-of-things-devices-applications-examples-2016-8.
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On January 29, 2017, Forbes reported that the IoT market
was predicted to reach $276 billion by 2020, with “predictive
maintenance, self-optimizing production, and automated
inventory management” as the top three uses of IoT
technology.12 On February 7, 2017, Gartner predicted that 8.4
billion IoT devices would be in use globally in 2017, rising 31
percent from 2016.13 On October 24, 2017, IHS Markit estimated
that there were nearly 27 billion IoT devices worldwide in 2017,
three times the estimate of Gartner.14 IHS Markit predicted the
number of devices would jump to over 30 billion by 2020.15
Despite the rapid growth of the devices, and the potential
benefits they offer, the IoT raises significant security and
privacy concerns. The most significant challenge is to determine
whether a self-regulatory regime will be sufficient to address
these concerns, or whether comprehensive or sectoral legislation
or regulation will be necessary to ensure that the public interest
in protecting personal privacy and data security will be
addressed, and that adequate remedies will be available in the
event of systemic failures.
This article first addresses the security issues and concerns
arising from the IoT, drawing particular attention to recent
cyberattacks targeting computer systems and the IoT. This
article next turns to the privacy issues related to IoT devices,
especially those containing health data and data collected from
children, which led to actions by Mattel, the FTC, and the FBI
to mitigate some of the privacy concerns.
Third, this article examines regulatory actions in the United
States by the federal government, including the FTC, National
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), four
U.S. Senators, and four U.S. Representatives, as well as by
private companies within the IoT industry practicing selfregulation. As a means of comparison, this article next discusses
12. Louis Columbus, Internet of Things Market to Reach $267B by 2020,
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus
/2017/01/29/internet-of-things-market-to-reach-267b-by-2020/#7d16f853609b.
13. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things”
Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017),
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917.
14. Press Release, IHS Markit, Number of Connected IoT Devices Will
Surge to 125 Billion by 2030, IHS Markit Says (October 24, 2017),
http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/number-connected-iot-devices-willsurge-125-billion-2030-ihs-markit-says.
15. Id.

2018]

REWRITING THE “BOOK OF THE MACHINE”

459

actions taken by the European Union, the Article 29 Working
Party,16 and European organizations to address security and
privacy concerns related to the IoT. Whereas the United States
takes a sectoral approach to privacy, with laws and regulations
designed to address specific industries, the EU prefers an
omnibus approach to privacy through implementation of an
overarching, blanket law regulating privacy consistently across
industries, providing certain rights to EU citizens regardless of
context.17 More specifically, this article addresses how two major
EU regulations—the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and the ePrivacy Regulation—implicate the IoT,
especially guidelines aiming to mitigate concerns regarding the
collection of EU individuals’ personal data and the vulnerability
of such data.
Finally, this article discusses who may be liable in the event
of an IoT device malfunction or a cyberattack during which
personal data stored on the device or a larger network is stolen.
Although this remains an unanswered question in the courts,
this article points to three areas of law and enforcement that
suggest how liability may be determined and handled, including
(1) enforcement actions by the FTC related to IoT devices, (2)
End User License Agreements (EULAs) and product liability
law, and (3) additional avenues, beyond product liability, that
consumers may claim compensation for damages related to IoT
devices, including some state data breach statutes.
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES AND CONCERNS
RAISED BY THE INTERNET OF THINGS
In order to understand the reasons behind regulation of the
IoT, as well as potential liability, it is necessary to consider both
the security and the privacy concerns associated with the
devices. Experts warn that IoT devices will continue to be subject
to cyberattacks in 2018, similar to the May 2017 WannaCry

16. See infra note 247.
17. Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to
Privacy Law, TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com
/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/; see also Natasha Singer, Data
Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protectionlaws-an-ocean-apart.html.
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attack18 and the October 2016 Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks19 that targeted computer systems and the IoT,
worldwide. These same experts argue that what constitutes
reasonable security has not been clearly defined,20 potentially
leading to the “security crisis of 2018.”21
Similarly, experts maintain that privacy concerns
associated with the IoT will continue throughout 2018 because
the industry lacks proper oversight regarding personal data
collected by IoT devices.22 Of particular concern, many IoT
devices collect “extremely sensitive data,” including health data
and data collected from children’s toys, despite efforts by the
FTC and FBI to alert consumers to these potential privacy
issues.23
A. SECURITY ISSUES AND CONCERNS
In April 2017, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), an independent agency
within the U.S. Department of Commerce, noted that the
“[s]ecurity of [IoT] devices is increasingly important to the
security and safety of consumers, businesses, and others.”24 The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) warns that the
security issues associated with IoT devices arise because they
are connected to the internet, making them vulnerable to
18. Ian Sherr, WannaCry Ransomware: Everything You Need to Know,
CNET (May 19, 2017, 12:29 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/wannacrywannacrypt-uiwix-ransomware-everything-you-need-to-know/.
19. What Is a DDoS Attack?, DIGITAL ATTACK MAP, https://www
.digitalattackmap.com/understanding-ddos/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); see also
Margaret Rouse, Definition: Disrupted Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack,
TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributeddenial-of-service-attack.
20. Jimmy H. Koo, Dumb Devices Smarten Up, Widening Data Security
Enforcement Net, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (Bloomberg Law, New York,
N.Y.) Jan. 8, 2018, at 1.
21. Nick Ismail, The Internet of Things: The Security Crisis of 2018?, INFO.
AGE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.information-age.com/internet-things-securitycrisis-123470475/.
22. Bree Fowler, Gifts That Snoop? The Internet of Things Is Wrapped in
Privacy Concerns, CONSUMER REPS. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www
.consumerreports.org/internet-of-things/gifts-that-snoop-internet-of-thingsprivacy-concerns/.
23. Id.
24. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., COMMUNICATING IOT DEVICE
SECURITY UPDATE CAPABILITY TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY FOR
CONSUMERS (2017).
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cyberattacks that can be used to gain access to an entire
network.25 Complicating matters, most computer systems
prevent against, or mitigate, cyberattacks through patches via
regular updates.26 However, many IoT devices have not been
designed to use such patches in their software, leaving security
issues unresolved.27
Furthermore, some IoT devices utilize cloud storage services
that use remote servers to store data. Such “splitting control”
over the device and the data leaves both prone to cyberattacks
that may compromise the security of the devices and the data.28
However, most IoT devices do not send collected data through
networks to a centralized cloud server because of limited power,
as well as limited connectivity and bandwidth.29 Instead, most
IoT devices utilize “fog computing,” meaning the device itself or
a nearby router are used to analyze and process the sensor
data.30 This decentralized IoT architecture, with data being
stored and secured locally, prevents some of the security
concerns associated with cloud storage;31 however, it does not
completely alleviate security issues, which are discussed below.
In November 2013, the FTC held a workshop, titled “The
Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World,”
during which panelists from government, industry, and
consumer groups discussed a variety of issues related to IoT.32
In a January 2015 report stemming from the workshop, the FTC
detailed both the benefits and the risks of the IoT, including
security concerns.33 In particular, the FTC highlighted three
potential threats to consumers.34 First, IoT devices “enabl[e]
unauthorized access and misuse of personal information” by

25. Internet of Things (IoT), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/internet/iot/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rhys Dipshan, The IoT Ambiguity: Secure Architecture, Vulnerable
Data, LEGALTECH NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews
/sites/legaltechnews/2018/02/02/the-iot-ambiguity-secure-architecturevulnerable-data/.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8.
33. Id. at iii.
34. Id. at ii.
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intruders and hackers gaining access to the data.35 Second, IoT
devices “facilitat[e] attacks on other systems,” such as the
network to which the IoT device is connected.36 Finally, IoT
devices may “create risks to physical safety in some cases.”37 For
example, one participant at the FTC workshop declared that he
had hacked insulin pumps, allowing him to change the settings
remotely to stop the machines.38 A different participant claimed
that he could gain remote access to a car’s internal computer
network, allowing him to control the engine and braking
systems.39
In the years since the report was published, IoT devices
have been subject to ransomware and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks, which many experts expect to continue,
and increase, throughout 2018.40 A ransomware attack occurs
when hackers use a virus to infect a computer and to encrypt all
of its data, making the data inaccessible.41 The hackers then
demand a ransom from the affected computer user to decrypt the
data.42 If the computer user fails to pay the ransom within a
certain amount of time, the virus destroys the files.43 In 2017,
security company Symantec reported that ransomware attacks
jumped to 483,800 incidents in 2016, an increase of more than
one-third compared to 2015.44 By contrast, a DDoS attack “is an
attempt to make an online service unavailable by overwhelming
it with traffic from multiple sources.”45 The cybercriminal begins
a DDoS attack by exploiting the vulnerability of just one device,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Ben Dickson, Why IoT Security Is So Critical, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 24, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/24/why-iot-security-is-socritical/ (“In another development, it was proven that Internet-connected cars
can be compromised, as well, and hackers can carry out any number of malicious
activities, including taking control of the entertainment system, unlocking the
doors or even shutting down the car in motion.”).
40. Ismail, supra note 21; see also Chris Preimesberger, Predictions 2018:
Internet of Things Will Expand as Threat Vector, EWEEK (Dec. 28, 2017),
http://www.eweek.com/security/predictions-2018-internet-of-things-willexpand-as-threat-vector.
41. Sherr, supra note 18.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. What Is a DDoS Attack?, supra note 19; see also Rouse, supra note 19.
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making it the DDoS “master,” which then identifies other
vulnerable devices, networks, and systems.46
One example of a large ransomware attack targeting
internet and computer systems is the virus named WannaCry.47
In May 2017, hackers targeted computers running the Microsoft
Windows operating system by encrypting data and subsequently
demanding ransom payments.48 The WannaCry attack affected
thousands of computers in more than 150 countries.49 One of the
more serious effects of the attack was the targeting of sixteen
hospitals across the United Kingdom, leading to the cancellation
of appointments and non-urgent operations at some locations.50
The UK National Health Service stated that although the attack
severely affected operations at the hospitals, particularly
freezing computer operations running on an outdated Windows
operating system, there was no indication that any patient data
had been compromised.51 The global financial and economic
damage caused by WannaCry approached billions of dollars,
making it one of the most damaging ransomware incidents in
history.52
An example of a large-scale DDoS attack took place in
October 2016 and directly targeted IoT devices. On October 26,
2016, The Guardian, among other media outlets, reported that
the DDoS attack affected a large portion of the U.S. internet by
46. Rouse, supra note 19.
47. Jane E. Kirtley, Global Privacy and Data Protection—2017, in
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 365,
440 (2017).
48. Timothy B. Lee, The WannaCry Ransomware Attack Was Temporarily
Halted. But It’s Not Over Yet, VOX (May 15, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox
.com/new-money/2017/5/15/15641196/wannacry-ransomware-windows-xp.
49. Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: What We Know Monday, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (May 15, 2017, 2:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/the twoway/2017/05/15/528451534/wannacry-ransomware-what-we-know-monday.
50. Russell Brandom, UK Hospitals Hit with Massive Ransomware Attack,
VERGE (May 12, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/12
/15630354/nhs-hospitals-ransomware-hack-wannacry-bitcoin; see also Denis
Campbell & Haroon Siddique, Operations Cancelled as Hunt Accused of
Ignoring Cyber-Attack Warnings, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 8:58 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/15/warning-of-nhs-cyberattack-was-not-acted-on-cybersecurity (“Operations and hospital clinic
appointments due to take place on Tuesday have been cancelled . . . .”).
51. Brandom, supra note 50.
52. Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” Ransomware Attack Losses Could Reach
$4 Billion, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/.
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infecting a network of computers with Mirai, malware meant to
bombard a server with so much traffic that it eventually
collapses.53 The servers belonged to Dyn, “a company that is a
major provider of DNS services to other companies.”54 The
Guardian reported that the attack affected the function of
several websites “including Twitter, the Guardian, Netflix,
Reddit, CNN and many others in Europe and the US.”55
According to WeLiveSecurity, a publication of IT security
company ESET, the DDoS attacks were “made possible by the
large number of unsecured internet-connected digital devices,
such as home routers and surveillance cameras.”56 The attacks
infected thousands of IoT devices with the Mirai malware in
order to find additional unsecured devices.57 The result was the
formation of a botnet, a group of hijacked Internet-connected
private devices controlled remotely without the device’s owner’s
consent or knowledge.58 Experts also pointed to default
passwords of IoT devices as another reason for the DDoS attack.
WeLiveSecurity explained that “anyone placing [a smart] device
on the internet without first changing the default password is,
in effect, enabling attacks of the type witnessed on October 21.”59
A 2017 report by Corero Network Security, which provides
DDoS protection and mitigation for its clients, found that in Q3
of 2017, organizations faced an average of 237 DDoS attack
attempts per month, marking a 35% increase from Q2, and a
91% increase from Q1.60 Researchers have argued that one

53. Stephen Cobb, 10 Things to Know About the October 21 IoT DDoS
Attacks, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://www.welivesecurity
.com/2016/10/24/10-things-know-october-21-iot-ddos-attacks/; see also Nicky
Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in History,
Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet (discussing the Mirai
botnet and its role in the attack).
54. Cobb, supra note 53.
55. Woolf, supra note 53.
56. Cobb, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also Botnet DDoS Attacks, INCAPSULA, https://www.incapsula
.com/ddos/botnet-ddos.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (defining botnet).
59. Cobb, supra note 53.
60. Alison DeNisco Rayome, DDoS Attacks Increased 91% in 2017 Thanks
to IoT, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com
/article/ddos-attacks-increased-91-in-2017-thanks-to-iot/; see also CORERO &
GTT, CORERO & GTT DDOS TRENDS REPORT: Q2–Q3 2017, 3 (2017),
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reason for the increase is the growing implementation of IoT
devices, many of which remain unsecured.61
More generally, in a 2017 survey, strategic consulting firm
Altman Vilandrie & Company found that nearly half of U.S.
companies using an IoT network were hit by a security breach.62
The survey polled 400 IT executives across nineteen industries,
with 48% reporting that they had experienced a breach.63
Furthermore, experts predict that small businesses may become
a preferred target of hackers throughout 2018.64 Jason J. Hogg,
CEO of Aon Cyber Solutions, anticipates that one of the largest
targets for IoT hacking in 2018 will be small businesses that use
this technology because hackers “[target] IoT [devices] as a pivot
point to enter systems and take control of physical operations.”65
Successful attacks on small businesses can create a domino
effect: damaging larger corporations that receive their services.66
However, despite all these security concerns, Bloomberg
Intelligence analyst Jawahar Hingorani observes that
companies are “often playing catch-up” to keep up with old and
new security problems.67 Bloomberg BNA adds that what
constitutes reasonable security, whether defined by the FTC or
private companies, “remains undefined.”68 In its “Information
Age” blog, digital media company Vitesse Media predicts that
IoT may be the “security crisis of 2018,” especially if companies
https://www.gtt.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Corero-Q2-Q3-TrendReports.pdf (establishing quoted statistics).
61. Rayome, supra note 60.
62. Larry Karisny, IoT Is Changing the Cybersecurity Industry, GOV’T
TECH. (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/security/IoT-Is-Changing-theCybersecurity-Industry.html; see also Ken Briodagh, New Survey Says Half of
US Companies Using IoT Have Been Breached, IOT EVOLUTION (June 1, 2017),
http://www.iotevolutionworld.com/iot/articles/432498-new-survey-says-half-uscompanies-using-iot.htm (discussing the 2017 survey).
63. Briodagh, supra note 62.
64. AON, 2018 CYBERSECURITY PREDICTIONS: A SHIFT TO MANAGING
CYBER AS AN ENTERPRISE RISK 13 (2018), https://www.strozfriedberg.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/2018-Cybersecurity-Predictions-Report-Aon-CyberSolutions.pdf; see also Rob Starr, Hackers Will Target Small Business Through
the Internet of Things in 2018, New Report Says, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Jan. 16,
2018), https://smallbiztrends.com/2018/01/2018-cybersecurity-predictions.html
(referencing the Aon report’s finding that hackers will target small businesses
that use IoT technology in 2018).
65. Starr, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Koo, supra note 20.
68. Id.
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and organizations, as well as federal agencies, do not work to
update security measures, policies, and potential solutions.69
B. PRIVACY ISSUES AND CONCERNS
In its 2015 report, the FTC also addressed privacy concerns
associated with IoT devices: that they directly collect sensitive
information, including precise geolocation, financial account
numbers, health information, and more.70 Furthermore, the IoT
involves large aggregations of data.71 The FTC reported that
approximately 10,000 households using a single company’s IoT
home automation product can collectively “generate 150 million
discrete data points a day,”72 or about “one data point every six
seconds for each household.”73 The creation of “[s]uch a massive
volume of granular data allows those with,” or without, “access
to the data to perform analyses . . . [impossible] with less rich
data sets.”74 Another privacy concern raised by the FTC is that
a manufacturer, cybercriminal, or even law enforcement, could
remotely “eavesdrop” on an individual’s home, a school, a
hospital, or other private areas, leading to warrantless
surveillance or illegal searches and recordings in violation of
common law, privacy, and Fourth Amendment rights.75
Two types of “extremely sensitive” personal data have been
highlighted as areas of particular concern moving forward:
health data and data collected by children’s toys. Regarding
health data, Jimmy Koo in Bloomberg BNA observes that
devices such as wearable fitness trackers that connect to the
internet collect “extremely sensitive” health data about
individuals’ personal wellness.76 The FTC contended in 2015
that such information could be used by insurance companies to
decide whether to preemptively raise or lower individuals’
insurance costs or deductible.77
Med Device Online, an online resource for manufacturers in
medical device design, suggests that healthcare data, including
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ismail, supra note 21.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 14.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
Koo, supra note 20.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 15–16.
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medical records and results from hospital equipment such as
MRI and X-ray machines, is also vulnerable as IoT medical
devices become increasingly common in hospitals and the
healthcare industry.78 IBM’s “2016 Cyber Security Intelligence
Index” found that healthcare was the top industry cyberattacked
in 2015,79 including by the WannaCry attack. Studies from 2017
also suggest that the healthcare industry remains a major
target, with organizations facing a new cyberattack every two
weeks.80
The second area receiving particular attention is children’s
toys and personal data. CBS News contributor and Wired
magazine editor-in-chief Nicholas Thompson asserts that there
is “a real discrepancy between the privacy protections built into
most internet-connected toys and the privacy protections that
you want for your children” largely because it is hard to update
children’s toys.81 Thompson drew particular attention to toys
that have microphones and cameras, suggesting they can be
used by hackers to eavesdrop, as has happened with baby
monitors.82 Children’s toys that collect information such as
names, email addresses, and home addresses are also vulnerable
to hacking, especially if the information is stored in the cloud.83

78. Mildred Segura et al., The Internet of Medical Things Raises Novel
Compliance Challenges, MED DEVICE ONLINE (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/the-internet-of-medical-things-raisesnovel-compliance-challenges-0001.
79. Zlata Rodionova, Healthcare Is Now Top Industry for Cyberattacks,
Says IBM, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news
/business/news/healthcare-is-now-top-industry-for-cyberattacks-says-ibma6994526.html.
80. Maia Hightower, Industry Voices—Preserving Quality of Care in the
Face of Cybersecurity Threats, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:30 PM),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/privacy-security/cybersecurity-medicaldevices-internet-things-wannacry-patient-harm-quality.
81. Why You Should Be “Wary” of Gifting an Internet-Connected Smart Toy,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/internet-connectedsmart-toys-be-wary-of-gifting-privacy-security/.
82. Id.; see also Stuart Madnick, Security Surprises Arising from the
Internet of Things (IoT), FORBES TECH BLOG (May 8, 2017, 10:01 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2017/05/08/security-surprises-arisingfrom-the-internet-of-things-iot/#7ef3a7fd2495 (“Baby monitors have been
turned into eavesdropping devices . . . .”).
83. See Why You Should Be “Wary” of Gifting an Internet-Connected Smart
Toy, supra note 81 (“‘We’ve had internet-connected toys that store information
on the cloud like your child’s voice that can then be hacked.’ There have also
been hacks that exposed personal data like names, email and home addresses.”).
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He added that children “don’t have defenses against privacy
invasions because they haven’t learned these things.”84
These privacy concerns prompted toy company Mattel, the
FTC, and the FBI in 2017 to take precautionary actions related
to children’s IoT toys. First, on October 4, 2017, Mattel
announced that it had canceled plans to sell “Aristotle,” a smart
device aimed at young children, amidst growing security and
privacy concerns related to the device.85 Mattel had introduced
the device in January 2017, which combined a smart speaker
with a digital assistant functionality and connected camera.86 A
May 2017 Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (CCFC)
petition pointed out that although the device was intended to
soothe a crying baby with “nightlights, lullabies, and sleep
sounds,” it would also collect and store data about a child’s
activity.87 Further, according to the petition, it would “connect[]
to other apps and online retailers, which means that data may
be shared with those partner corporations, which may use it to
target the marketing of other products to young children and
their parents.”88 In a statement, a spokeswoman for Mattel said
that the decision not to sell Aristotle was prompted by Sven
Gerjets, the company’s new chief technology officer, who
conducted a review of the Aristotle product and decided that it
did not “fully align with Mattel’s new technology strategy . . . .”89

84. Id.
85. James Vincent, Mattel Cancels AI Babysitter After Privacy Complaints,
VERGE (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/5/16430822/mattelaristotle-ai-child-monitor-canceled.
86. Id.
87. Stop Mattel’s Aristotle from Trading Children’s Privacy for Profit, CCFC
https://org.salsalabs.com/o/621/p/dia/action4/common/public/?action_KEY=217
18; see also Letter from Josh Golin & Michael O’Heaney, Executive Directors,
Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, to Margaret Georgiadis, CEO,
Mattel, Inc. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites
/default/files/Letter%20to%20Mattel.pdf.
88. Stop Mattel’s Aristotle from Trading Children’s Privacy for Profit, supra
note 87.
89. Hayley Tsukayama, Mattel Has Canceled Plans for a Kid-Focused AI
Device that Drew Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/04/mattel-hasan-ai-device-to-soothe-babies-experts-are-begging-them-not-to-sellit/?utm_term=.75fb93da0d12.
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Second, on June 21, 2017, the FTC published a press
release, “FTC Updates COPPA Compliance Plan for Business,”90
which described how the FTC updated its Six Step Compliance
Plan for businesses regarding the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).91 Section 6502(a) of COPPA,
titled “Regulation of unfair and deceptive acts and practices in
connection with collection and use of personal information from
and about children on the Internet,” makes it “unlawful for an
operator of a website or online service directed to children, or
any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting
personal information from a child, to collect personal
information from a child in a manner that violates the
regulations” of the statute.92
The main revision of the FTC’s compliance plan directed
vendors to initially “Determine if Your Company is a Website or
Online Service that Collects Personal Information from Kids
Under 13,” and the revision now included “connected toys or
other Internet of Things devices” under the definition of
“Website or online service.”93 Additionally, the FTC added two
ways that companies could obtain parents’ permission before
collecting children’s personal information: “asking knowledgebased authentication questions and using facial recognition to
get a match with a verified photo ID.”94
On July 17, 2017, the FBI published a public service
announcement, which also addressed “privacy and contact
concerns for children” in relation to IoT toys.95 The FBI alert

90. Kristin Cohen & Peder Magee, FTC Updates COPPA Compliance Plan
for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUSINESS BLOG (June 21, 2017, 10:26 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/06/ftc-updatescoppa-compliance-plan-business; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a); Jane E. Kirtley,
FTC Takes Multiple Steps Towards Privacy and Security for IoT Consumers, in
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 393,
393–400 (2017) [hereinafter FTC Takes Multiple Steps].
91. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06
(2012).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (2012).
93. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan
for Your Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-sixstep-compliance.
94. Cohen & Magee, supra note 90.
95. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ALERT NO. I-071717 (REVISED)-PSA,
CONSUMER NOTICE: INTERNET-CONNECTED TOYS COULD PRESENT PRIVACY
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encouraged consumers to “consider cyber security prior to
introducing smart, interactive, internet-connected toys into
their homes or trusted environments,” citing the FTC’s updated
compliance plan.96 According to the FBI, the toys “typically
contain sensors, microphones, cameras, data storage
components, and other multimedia capabilities—including
speech recognition and GPS options” and can connect to the
Internet, which means the toys “could put the privacy and safety
of children at risk due to the large amount of personal
information that may be unwittingly disclosed.”97 The alert also
provided recommendations for families regarding IoT toys,
including “[c]arefully read disclosures and privacy policies” and
“[c]losely monitor children’s activity with the toys (such as
conversations and voice recordings) through the toy’s partner
parent application,” among other recommendations.98
Despite these actions by Mattel, the FTC, and the FBI,
privacy concerns remain for children’s toys as well as other IoT
devices. Security and privacy experts warn that there is still
“little oversight” of the data collected by the devices and how
they are protected from hackers and cyberattacks.99
Additionally, even if personal information is kept secure and
private by IoT companies, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
Northern District of California Hanley Chew notes that a law
enforcement or government official needs only to obtain a
subpoena to access IoT data because it can be interpreted as
falling under “non-content” information as defined in the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.100 Subpoenas
do not require judicial approval, unlike search warrants, making
it easier for the police or federal agencies to obtain information
from IoT devices.101 Thus, questions remain about what data law

AND CONTACT CONCERNS FOR CHILDREN (2017), https://www.ic3.gov/media
/2017/170717.aspx; see also FTC Takes Multiple Steps, supra note 90, at 393.
96. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Fowler, supra note 22; see also Kathy Kristof, How to Tame Household
Privacy Threats from Toys, TVs and More, CBS MONEYWATCH (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-to-tame-household-privacy-threatsinternet-connected-toys/.
100. Dipshan, supra note 29.
101. Id.
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enforcement or government agencies will be able to access,
whether through a subpoena or a search warrant.102
III. REGULATION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES
On January 4, 2018, Bloomberg Law contended that despite
significant security and privacy concerns, IoT devices and data
remain largely unregulated, with “no specific law or regulation
governing how this data is used or collected.”103 However, the
federal government, as well as private companies, have recently
undertaken stronger measures to address the security and
privacy issues related to IoT devices. Paul Rosenzweig, the
founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, suggests that the
“most significant regulatory push in the United States” will
involve the IoT, with regulatory agencies imposing security and
privacy requirements.104
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In light of the security and privacy concerns associated with
IoT devices, experts have called on the federal government,
including federal agencies and Congress, to take a more active
role in coordinating security standards.105 Frost and Sullivan
IoT research director Dilip Sarangan contends that because the
responsibility of IoT privacy and security falls upon several
actors in the IoT industry, including manufacturers, network
providers, software developers, and others, it is difficult for the
industry to develop industry-wide standards.106 He further

102. See id.; Bruce Schneier, Law Enforcement Access to IoT Data, SCHNEIER
(Jan. 11, 2017, 6:22 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives
/2017/01/law_enforcement_1.html; Jonathon Hauenschild, Lawmakers Must
Clarify Privacy Protections for the Internet of Things, HILL (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:00
AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/312968-lawmakersmust-clarify-privacy-protections-for-the-internet-of.
103. Kirk Nahra, The Top Ten Privacy and Data Security Developments to
Watch in 2018, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://
biglawbusiness.com/the-top-ten-privacy-and-data-security-developments-towatch-in-2018/.
104. Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity Predictions for 2018, LAWFARE (Jan. 2,
2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-predictions-2018.
105. Jon Gold, IoT Security Needs a White Knight, NETWORKWORLD (Jan.
15, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.networkworld.com/article/3247774/internet-ofthings/iot-security-needs-a-white-knight.html.
106. Id.
ON SECURITY
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explains that IoT implementation has several moving parts that
may be administered by multiple different organizations and
third parties.107
From 2016 through January 2018, the FTC, National
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), four
U.S. Senators, and four U.S. Representatives, in association
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), took steps to
address IoT privacy and security concerns. First, the FTC was
involved in several legal disputes connected to the IoT and
security.108 As discussed in Section II.B, the FTC also updated
its compliance plan regarding COPPA to include IoT devices,
with the FBI sending an alert related to similar concerns.109
Second, in a July 18, 2017 meeting, a public-private sector
working group (“Working Group”) convened by the NTIA,
finalized a guidance document drafted in April 2017 addressing
how manufacturers should communicate information to
consumers about security updates for IoT devices.110
Third, on August 1, 2017, four U.S. Senators introduced a
bipartisan bill aiming to improve the cybersecurity of IoT devices
supplied by vendors to the U.S. government.111 The legislation
contained several provisions, including requirements that
vendors “ensure [the] devices are patchable, rely on industry
standard protocols, do not use hard-coded passwords, and do not
contain any known security vulnerabilities.”112
Finally, on October 5, 2017, Rep. David Trott (R-Mich.)
introduced the “Internet of Medical Things Resilience
Partnership Act of 2017.”113 The legislation aimed to “establish
a working group of public and private entities led by the Food
107. Id.
108. See FTC Takes Multiple Steps, supra note 90, at 394–95.
109. Id. at 393; see also Cohen & Magee, supra note 90.
110. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 24, at 1.
111. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, Senators
Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Improve Cybersecurity of “Internet-ofThings” (IoT) Devices (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/pressreleases?id=06A5E941-FBC3-4A63-B9B4-523E18DADB36; see
also Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, S. 1691,
115th Cong. (2017).
112. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111.
113. Internet of Medical Things Resilience Partnership Act of 2017, H.R.
3985, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Segura et al., supra note 78.
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and Drug Administration to recommend voluntary frameworks
and guidelines to increase the security and resilience of Internet
of Medical Things devices, and for other purposes.”114
1. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Actions
Since convening the Working Group in 2013, the FTC has
viewed IoT security as a priority.115 In addition to explaining the
benefits and risks of the IoT in its 2015 report, the FTC provided
several recommendations for best practices businesses can
implement in order to protect consumers’ privacy and security,
including that manufacturers adopt a “security by design
approach” by building security into an IoT device.116 The FTC
supported not only providing notice to consumers about what
data is being collected, but also giving them a choice of how their
data is collected and shared.117 The FTC also explained how it
aimed to ensure that IoT manufacturers considered security and
privacy.118 Finally, the report emphasized the need to develop
self-regulatory programs to encourage the adoption of privacyand security-sensitive practices.119
Another action by the FTC regarding IoT privacy and
security was a contest launched in January 2017 “seeking tools
to help consumers protect the security of their [IoT] devices.”120
On July 26, 2017, the agency announced that a mobile app
developed by Steve Castle, a New Hampshire software

114. H.R. 3985.
115. Id.; see also Francoise Gilbert, Securing the Internet of Things Is an
FTC Priority, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/886166
/securing-the-internet-of-things-is-an-ftc-priority.
116. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Report on Internet of Things
Urges Companies to Adopt Best Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and
Security Risks (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/01/ftc-report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-bestpractices; see also FTC Takes Multiple Steps, supra note 90, 393–400 (2017).
117. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8; see also Jane E. Kirtley, FTC
Releases Report on the Internet of Things; Global Privacy and Data Protection,
in PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2015, at
655, 674 (2015).
118. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8.
119. Id.
120. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Internet of Things
Challenge to Combat Security Vulnerabilities in Home Devices (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-announcesinternet-things-challenge-combat-security; see also FTC Takes Multiple Steps,
supra note 90, 393–400 (2017).
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developer, had won the $25,000 top prize.121 According to a press
release by the FTC, the app is intended to
help users manage the IoT devices in their home. It would enable
users with limited technical expertise to scan their home Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth networks to identify and inventory connected devices. It
would flag devices with out-of-date software and other common
vulnerabilities and provide instructions on how to update each
device’s software and fix other vulnerabilities.122

Apart from the report and contest, the FTC has also reached
settlements with several companies in IoT related cases,
including ASUSTeK Computer Inc. (ASUS), D-Link Systems,
Inc. (D-Link), Lenovo Group Ltd. (Lenovo), Vizio Inc. (Vizio), and
VTech.123
a. ASUSTeK Computer Inc.
On February 23, 2016, the FTC announced that it had
reached a settlement with Taiwan-based computer hardware
maker ASUS after the agency contended that security flaws in
its routers put the home networks of hundreds of thousands of
consumers at risk.124 According to the FTC’s complaint, ASUS
introduced a feature known as AiCloud on its routers in August
2012, labeling it as a “private personal cloud for selective file
sharing” allowing “indefinite storage and increased privacy.”125
The FTC alleged that AiCloud had “multiple vulnerabilities that
would allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to consumers’
files and router login credentials.”126 The FTC further alleged
that ASUS failed to provide notice to consumers that the
121. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Winner of its
Internet of Things Home Device Security Contest (July 26, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/07/ftc-announces-winnerits-internet-things-home-device-security.
122. Id.
123. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ASUS Settles FTC Charges that
Insecure Home Routers and “Cloud” Services Put Consumers’ Privacy at Risk
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/asussettles-ftc-charges-insecure-home-routers-cloud-services-put; see Jimmy Koo,
FTC Reports on 2017 Privacy, Data Security Enforcement, BLOOMBERG BNA
PRIVACY & DATA SEC. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.bna.com/ftc-reports2017-b73014474565/; see also Daniel R. Stoller, Lenovo Settles FTC, State Ad
Software Security, Privacy Claims, BLOOMBERG BNA: NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/lenovo-settles-ftc-n73014464166/.
124. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 123.
125. Complaint, ASUSTeK Comput., Inc., No. C-4587, File No. 142–3156, at
*2 (F.T.C. July 8, 2016).
126. Id.
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vulnerabilities existed, nor had it advised consumers how to
disable AiCloud features that would mitigate the
vulnerabilities.127
ASUS also introduced another cloud storage feature called
AiDisk, which enabled individuals to remotely access files on a
USB storage device attached to the router.128 Regarding this
feature, the FTC alleged that it had an “insecure design” because
default settings provided “anyone on the internet with
unauthenticated access to all of the files saved on the consumer’s
USB storage device.”129 ASUS again failed to notify consumers
about the security concerns for nearly a year.130 The complaint
added several additional vulnerabilities of ASUS products.131
In July 2016, the FTC finalized the settlement, which
required ASUS to establish and maintain a comprehensive
security program subject to independent audits for the next 20
years, as well as to notify consumers about software updates or
other steps to protect themselves from security flaws.132 The
agency called the settlement part of an “ongoing effort to ensure
that companies secure the software and devices that they
provide to consumers.”133
b. D-Link Systems, Inc.
On January 5, 2017, the FTC filed a complaint seeking a
permanent injunction and other equitable relief against D-Link
Corporation and D-Link Systems, Inc. (collectively “D-Link”) in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Francisco Division, alleging that D-Link’s internet cameras
and routers contained inadequate security measures.134

127. Id. at *3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *5.
132. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order in ASUS
Privacy Case (July 28, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/07/ftc-approves-final-order-asus-privacy-case.
133. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n., supra note 123.
134. Melissa Daniels, D-Link Sued by FTC Over Security Flaws in Routers,
Cameras, LAW360 (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/877899; see
also Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Corp., No. 17-CV-00039 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170105_d-link_complaint
_and_exhibits.pdf; FTC Takes Multiple Steps, supra note 90, 393–400 (2017).
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According to the FTC’s complaint, Taiwan-based D-Link
Corporation “directed its activities to the United States by
designing, developing, marketing, and manufacturing routers,
Internet-protocol (‘IP’) cameras, and related software and
services, intended for use by consumers throughout the United
States.”135 D-Link Systems, Inc., the corporation’s U.S.
subsidiary, “advertised, marketed, distributed, or sold routers,
IP cameras, and related software and services, intended for use
by consumers throughout the United States.” 136
The FTC alleged that D-Link engaged “in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices”137 because the company “[failed] to
take reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet-protocol
cameras they designed for, marketed, and sold to United States
consumers.”138 Furthermore, the FTC argued that D-Link “failed
to take reasonable steps to protect their routers and IP cameras
from widely known and reasonably foreseeable risks of
unauthorized access[.]”139 Consequently, the FTC contended
that these failures led to “thousands” of routers and cameras
being vulnerable to cyberattacks, putting consumers’ personal
information and local networks at risk,140 and requested
injunctive relief, though the agency did not allege that any
personal data had been exposed.141
However, on September 25, 2017, Bloomberg BNA reported
that the FTC would have to refile some of its claims related to
security vulnerabilities and misleading advertising after a
federal judge dismissed three of the six unfairness claims

135. Complaint, supra note 134, at 2; see also Allison Grande, Taiwan Co.
Escapes US Court in FTC Data Security Case, LAW360 (May 11, 2017, 10:09
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/922914; Joint Stipulation and Order
Dismissing D-Link Corporation Without Prejudice, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. DLink Corp., No. 17-CV-00039 (N.D. Cal. filed May 15, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/2017.05.15_d.e._75_order_dis
missing_dlc_wo_prej._and_req_disc.pdf (stating that on May 11, 2017, the FTC
agreed to drop D-Link Corporation from the lawsuit).
136. Complaint, supra note 134, at 3.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
138. Complaint, supra note 134, at 2.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 5–7.
141. Id. at 13; see also Nicole Ewart & Reed Freeman, Federal Trade
Commission Issues Privacy and Data Security Report for 2017, WILMERHALE:
PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.wilmerhale
.com/blog/privacy-and-cybersecurity/post/?id=17179886720.
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stemming from the company’s alleged lax router security. 142 On
September 20, 2017, Consumerist reported that the dismissal
stemmed from the FTC’s lack of proof to substantiate half of its
claims.143 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California Judge James Donato wrote:
The FTC does not allege any actual consumer injury in the form of a
monetary loss or an actual incident where sensitive personal data was
accessed or exposed. Instead, the FTC relies solely on the likelihood
that DLS put consumers at “risk” . . . .144 That is effectively the sum
total of the harm allegations, and they make out a mere possibility of
injury at best. The FTC does not identify a single incident where a
consumer’s financial, medical or other sensitive personal information
has been accessed, exposed or misused in any way . . . . The absence
of any concrete facts makes it just as possible that [the] devices are
not likely to substantially harm consumers, and the FTC cannot rely
on wholly conclusory allegations about potential injury to tilt the
balance in its favor.145

Bloomberg BNA reported on January 24, 2018 that the FTC
had not refiled the dismissed claims, but the litigation over the
remaining charges remained ongoing.146
c. Lenovo Group Ltd.
On September 5, 2017, Lenovo agreed to no-fault
settlements with the FTC and 32 states amidst allegations by
the FTC that the ad software it installed had compromised users’
web security and invaded their privacy.147 The case arose in 2014
when Lenovo began selling laptops to U.S. consumers that came
with a preinstalled software program called VisualDiscovery.148
142. Daniel R. Stoller, D-Link Ducks Some FTC Internet of Things Data
Security Claims, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY (Sept. 25,
2017), https://www.bna.com/dlink-ducks-ftc-n57982088313/.
143. Laura Northrup, Judge Gives D-Link Partial Win in FTC Case over
Vulnerable Devices, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:28 PM),
https://consumerist.com/2017/09/20/judge-dismisses-ftc-case-accusing-d-linkof-selling-vulnerable-devices/.
144. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017
WL 4150873 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017); see also Paul Roberts, Court Balks
at FTC’s D-Link Complaint, Wants Proof of Harm, SECURITY LEDGER (Sept. 21,
2017, 6:21 PM), https://securityledger.com/2017/09/court-balks-ftcs-d-linkcomplaint-wants-proof-harm/.
145. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, slip op.
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).
146. Koo, supra note 123.
147. Stoller, supra note 123.
148. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lenovo Settles FTC Charges It
Harmed Consumers with Preinstalled Software on Its Laptops that
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The FTC alleged that the software “interfered with how a user’s
browser interacted with websites and created serious security
vulnerabilities” because it had access to “all of a consumer’s
sensitive personal information transmitted over the Internet,
including login credentials, Social Security numbers, medical
information, and financial and payment information.”149
Furthermore, problems with the software meant consumers’
browsers could not warn users when they visited malicious
websites with invalid digital certificates, according to the FTC
complaint.150
As part of the FTC settlement, Lenovo agreed not to
misrepresent any feature of installed software and to get
affirmative user consent before installing such software, as well
as provide an opt-out mechanism before loading similar
software. The company was also required to implement and
maintain a comprehensive data security software program for
any software it installs.151 Under the separate state agreement,
Lenovo agreed to pay 32 State Attorney Generals $3.5 million.152
d. Vizio Inc.
On February 6, 2017, Vizio agreed to pay $2.2 million to
settle a case with the FTC and the New Jersey attorney general’s
office.153 According to the FTC’s February 2014 complaint, Vizio
manufactured smart TVs that had a “Smart Interactivity”

Compromised Online Security (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/09/lenovo-settles-ftc-charges-it-harmed-consumerspreinstalled; see also Complaint, In the Matter of Lenovo Inc., Docket No. C4636 (Filed Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/152_3134_c4636_lenovo_united_states_decision_and_order.pdf.
149. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lenovo Settles FTC Charges It
Harmed Consumers with Preinstalled Software on Its Laptops that
Compromised Online Security (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/09/lenovo-settles-ftc-charges-it-harmed-consumerspreinstalled.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Hayley Tsukayama, Vizio Agrees to Pay $2.2 Million to Settle FTC’s
Television-Spying Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/vizio-agrees-to-pay-22-million-tosettles-ftcs-television-spying-case/2017/02/06/3d4d4b16-ec8f-11e6-96626eedf1627882_story.html.
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feature, which “enables program offers and suggestions.”154
However, the FTC alleged that Vizio failed to inform consumers
that the feature also enabled the collection of their viewing
data.155 The complaint further alleged that Vizio had appended
specific demographic information to the viewing data, such as
sex, age, income, marital status, household size, education level,
home ownership, and household value, before selling the data to
third parties.156 The FTC called Vizio’s data tracking unfair and
deceptive, because it was done without users’ consent.157
Following the settlement, an order by U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California Judge Josephine Staton
required Vizio to “prominently disclose and obtain affirmative
express consent for its data collection and sharing practices.”158
The order also required Vizio to delete data collected before
March 1, 2016, and to implement a comprehensive data privacy
program and biennial assessments of that program.159
e. VTech
On January 8, 2018, the FTC also reached a settlement in a
case regarding children’s toys and COPPA.160 The agency

154. Complaint ¶ 22, FTC v. Vizio Inc., NO. 17-CV-00758 (D.N.J. filed Feb.
6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017
.02.06_complaint.pdf; see also FTC Takes Multiple Steps, supra note 90, 393–
400 (2017).
155. Complaint, supra note 154, ¶ 38.
156. Id. ¶ 17; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vizio to Pay $2.2
Million to FTC, State of New Jersey to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing
Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without User’s Consent (Feb. 6,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it.
157. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 156.
158. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at
§ II.A., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Vizio Inc. NO. 17-CV-00758 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 6,
2017).
159. Id. §§ III, IV.
160. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Electronic Toy Maker VTech Settles
FTC Allegations that It Violated Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/electronictoy-maker-vtech-settles-ftc-allegations-it-violated; see also Alan Friel and
Carolina Alonso, Toying with Children’s Data: Lessons from the FTC’s First
Connected Toys Settlement Action, DATA PRIV. MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/coppa/toying-with-childrens-datalessons-from-the-ftcs-first-connected-toys-settlementaction/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm
_campaign=View-Original.
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reached a $650,000 settlement with VTech, which “develop[s] a
number of products and services for children,” including portable
devices known as “electronic learning products” or “ELPs.”161
The FTC contended in its complaint that VTech is therefore
subject to COPPA, which applies to any operator of a commercial
website or online service directed to children that collects, uses,
and/or discloses their personal information.162 COPPA requires
that such companies follow steps to ensure children’s
information is protected, which includes disclosing to parents
how the data is used.163
The main action of the litigation concerned Kid Connect, a
mobile application that allows children to communicate with
other children after parents or other adults download and
register the app.164 The FTC alleged that VTech failed to take
several steps required by COPPA, including failing to provide a
link to their privacy policy in each area where the app collected
personal information.165 VTech also failed to “develop,
implement, or maintain a comprehensive information security
program” and “implement adequate safeguards and security
measures,” among several other allegations.166
The complaint also claimed that VTech learned in
November 2015 that a hacker had gained remote access to the
company’s computer network through “commonly known and
reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities,” and withdrew personal
information from several IoT devices and apps, including Kid
Connect.167 Although VTech stored passwords and children’s
photos and audio files in an encrypted format, the hacker gained
access to a database that contained the decryption keys, which
would have allowed the cybercriminal to access the information.
It was not until a journalist approached the company that it
learned about the hack.168 Furthermore, the FTC alleged that
although VTech continued to assert in its privacy policy that

161. Complaint ¶ 10, U.S. v. Vtech, No. 1:18-cv-114 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 8,
2018) (hereinafter VTech Complaint).
162. Id. ¶¶ 17–21.
163. Id.
164. Id. ¶¶ 22–38.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 25.
167. Id. ¶ 27.
168. Id. ¶ 28.
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most personal information was encrypted, in fact, none of it was
actually encrypted.169
As part of its settlement with the FTC, VTech was
“permanently prohibited from violating COPPA in the future
and from misrepresenting its security and privacy practices.”170
The company was also required to implement a comprehensive
data security program subject to independent audits for 20
years.171 The litigation against VTech was one of over 20 COPPA
cases brought by the FTC since 2000 and provided an additional
example of how federal agencies, including the FTC and FBI,
have addressed security and privacy of children’s IoT devices
under COPPA.172
2. National Telecommunications and Information
Administration
On April 25, 2017, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), an independent agency
within the U.S. Department of Commerce, released a report
titled “Communicating IoT Device Security Update Capability to
Improve Transparency for Consumers.”173 Drafted by a publicprivate sector working group (“Working Group”) convened by the
NTIA, the document addressed how IoT companies, particularly
manufacturers, should communicate security updates for IoT
devices. In a July 18 meeting, the NTIA Working Group
169. Id. ¶ 12.
170. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 160.
171. Id.
172. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017, at 7
(2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-datasecurity-update-2017-overview-commissions-enforcement-policy-initiativesconsumer/privacy_and_data_security_update_2017.pdf.
173. Brian Kennedy, The FTC and Industry Propose Best Practices for IoT
Security Updates, HOGAN LOVELLS (July 28, 2017), http://www
.hldataprotection.com/2017/07/articles/cybersecurity-data-breaches/the-ftcand-industry-propose-best-practices-for-iot-security-updates/#page=1; see also
Jane E. Kirtley, NTIA Finalizes Document Regarding Communication of IoT
Security Update Information Following Comments from the FTC and Others, in
PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 400
(2017); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 24; Evan Wolff et al.,
Regulatory Rules Of The Road For IoT Manufacturers, LAW360 (July 28, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/946940/regulatory-rules-of-the-road-for-iotmanufacturers (noting that the document synthesized guidance materials from
various IoT stakeholders and regulators who had responded to a January 2017
NTIA green paper titled “Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of
Things.”).
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published the final version of its guidance document after
reaching a consensus.174
The first version of the document stated that security
updates to IoT devices “are a key way to protect IoT devices when
vulnerabilities are discovered and attacks evolve, though the
method and capability of IoT devices to receive security updates
varies across devices, services, and deployments.”175
Additionally, the document explained that IoT consumers “may
desire basic information about their devices’ security
capabilities, particularly with regard to whether and how
devices receive security updates.”176 The report added, “[t]here
is also interest on the part of many policymakers and
technologists for promoting transparency for consumers about
the security needs and capabilities of internet-enabled
devices.”177
Next, the NTIA document outlined information “that
manufacturers can communicate to better inform consumers
and the marketplace about IoT devices’ capability to receive
security updates . . . .”178 The information was divided into two
categories: “key elements” and “additional considerations.”179
The first key element recommended that businesses describe
“whether the [IoT] device is capable of receiving security
updates.”180 Second, the report recommended that IoT
companies provide a “[s]ummary of how the device receives
security updates,” including whether the device can receive
automatic updates and, if not, “[w]hat user action is required to
ensure the device is updated correctly and in a timely
fashion?”181 The final key element urged manufacturers to
“[d]escribe the anticipated timeline for the end of security
update support” because “routine security updates typically
[end] as a device or software reaches the end of its lifecycle.”182
Thus, it “may be helpful to describe how long . . . consumers

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 24.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 24.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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[can] expect, at a minimum, the device to receive security
updates.”183
Turning to “additional considerations,” the NTIA first
recommended that IoT companies “[d]escribe how the user is
notified about security updates,” through a notification
appearing on the IoT device or through an email.184 Second, the
document suggested that companies make clear “what happens
when the device no longer receives security update support.”185
Finally, the Working Group suggested that IoT manufacturers
describe how they ensure that security updates themselves are
secure.186
On June 19, 2017, the FTC provided public comments for
the NTIA recommendations.187 The FTC emphasized the
importance of consumers being provided “clear information
about whether, how, for how long, and at what cost their IoT
devices will receive security support,” in light of the growing
importance of “[ensuring IoT] devices are reasonably secure.”188
In so doing, the FTC argued, IoT companies “can benefit
consumers, foster competition, and promote innovation in
security.”189 The FTC also provided a series of recommendations
regarding the “key elements” and the “additional elements”
discussed by the Working Group.190
In a virtual meeting held on July 18, 2017, the NTIA
Working Group finalized its IoT document.191 The completed

183. Id.
184. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 24.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4.
187. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC COMMENT
ON “COMMUNICATION IOT DEVICE SECURITY UPDATE CAPABILITY TO IMPROVE
TRANSPARENCY FOR CONSUMERS” (June 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-nationaltelecommunications-information-administration-communicating-iot-devicesecurity/170619ntiaiotcomment.pdf; see also Kirtley, supra note 173; Wolff et
al., supra note 173 (noting that the NTIA also received over 130 responses from
IoT manufacturers, solution providers, security experts, and consumer
advocates, among other stakeholders).
188. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 187, at 2.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Joshua Higgins, NTIA Approves Finalized Guide on Communicating
IoT Security to Consumers, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (July 21, 2017),
https://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/ntia-approves-finalized-guidecommunicating-iot-security-consumers; see John J. Heitmann & Jameson
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document noted that it “reflects input and comments on earlier
draft versions that were received from various stakeholders
participating in the NTIA’s multistakeholder process, including
comments provided by the Federal Trade Commission.”192 One
particular change was the addition of the phrase “for when
support begins or ends (e.g. Jan. 1, 2025, or one year after date
of registration)” regarding the “anticipated timeline” provided by
IoT manufacturers.193 Second, the final document updated the
recommendation that manufacturers describe “how the user is
notified about security updates” to include an “optional
subscription service offering affirmative notifications” and “the
timing of updates, such as if updates are available on a regular
schedule.”194 The Working Group emphasized that the
guidelines “[were] not meant to supersede regulation or serve as
a legal standard” but instead “to identify and consolidate critical
points it recommends manufacturers weigh as they develop IoT
devices.”195
3. U.S. Senate Bill
On August 1, 2017, four U.S. Senators introduced a
bipartisan bill, which aimed to improve the security of IoT
devices by “establishing minimum security requirements for
federal procurements of connected devices.”196 U.S. Sens. Mark

Dempsey, NTIA Holds Virtual Meeting of Multistakeholder Process on Internet
of Things Security Upgradability and Patching, COMMLAW MONITOR (July 28,
2017),
http://www.commlawmonitor.com/2017/07/articles/federal-stateregulatory/ntia-holds-virtual-meeting-of-multistakeholder-process-on-internetof-things-security-upgradability-and-patching/; see also Kirtley, supra note 173.
192. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 24.
193. Id. at 3 (The section now reads: “[s]upport for routine security updates
typically ends as a device or software reaches the end of its lifecycle. If [sic] may
be helpful to describe how long can consumers expect, at a minimum, the device
to receive security update support. A specific date for when support begins or
ends (e.g. Jan. 1, 2025) may be preferable to a general time period, though
companies may describe their product lifecycles differently. If the device will be
supported indefinitely without foreseeable end, or if the duration update
support is unknown, manufacturers might indicate this.”).
194. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN, supra note 24.
195. John J. Heitmann & Jameson J. Dempsey, NTIA Holds Virtual Meeting
of Multistakeholder Process on Internet of Things Security Upgradability and
Patching, LEXOLOGY (July 28, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=83a1cc1d-7a8a-4b28-b136-2adde1398188.
196. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111; see also Jane E. Kirtley, U.S. Senators Introduce Bill Seeking to Improve
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R. Warner (D-Va.) and Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), co-chairs of the
Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, as well as Sens. Ron Wyden (DOr.) and Steve Daines (R-Mont.), introduced the “Internet of
Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017,” which
aimed to require that IoT “devices purchased by the U.S.
government meet certain minimum security requirements.”197
“Inter-connected device” is defined as “a physical object that (a)
is capable of connecting to and is in regular connection with the
Internet; and (b) has computer processing capabilities that can
collect, send, or receive data.”198
The legislation outlines several requirements for IoT
vendors, including that their IoT devices are “patchable” in order
“to fix or remove a vulnerability or defect in the software or
firmware component in a properly authenticated and secure
manner.”199 Second, the bill requires vendors to ensure that
their products do not contain “known vulnerabilities,”200
meaning “any attribute of hardware, firmware, software,
process, or procedure or combination of 2 or more of these factors
that could enable or facilitate the defeat or compromise of the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information
system or its information or physical devices to which it is
connected.”201 Third, the bill requires that vendors ensure their
IoT devices “rely on standard protocols,” such as “standard ports
for network traffic,” encryption, or “interconnection with other

Security of IoT Devices, in PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 405–09 (2017).
197. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111.
198. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note
111; see also Sarah Wronsky & Lawrence Block, Proposed Internet of Things
Cybersecurity Bill May Create Hurdles for Government Contractors, GLOBAL
REG. ENFORCEMENT LAW BLOG (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com
/library/detail.aspx?g=c0da944b-4c46-4812-8bbf-dbf2540db87f.
199. See Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra
note 111; Sen. Mark Warner et al., Fact Sheet, Internet of Things Cybersecurity
Improvement Act of 2017, MARK R. WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
COMMONWEALTH VA., https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6
/861d66b8-93bf-4c93-84d06bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iot-cybesecurityimprovement-act—-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
200. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note
111; see also Mark Warner et al., supra note 199.
201. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note
111.
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devices.”202 Finally, IoT devices cannot “include any fixed or
hard-coded credentials used for remote administration, the
delivery of updates, or communication.”203
The legislation next outlines ways IoT vendors can help
manage risks stemming from insecure devices. More specifically,
if a governmental agency “reasonably believes that
procurement of an [IoT] device [compliant with the legislation]
would be unfeasible or economically impractical,” it may petition
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for permission “to
purchase a non-compliant [IoT] device.”204 The OMB is required
to develop “alternative network-level security requirements for
devices with limited data processing and software
functionality.”205 Each governmental agency is also required to
maintain an inventory of their use of IoT devices.206 Finally, the
bill directs the Department of Homeland Security National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NDDP) to
[w]ork with industry to develop coordinated disclosure guidelines for
vendors selling IoT to the US government, which vendors would then
adopt, allowing researchers to uncover vulnerabilities in those
products and responsibly share them with the vendor, without fear of
liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) or
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).207

In an August 1, 2017 statement, Sen. Warner explained why
the legislation is needed.208 “While I’m tremendously excited
about the innovation and productivity that Internet-of-Things
devices will unleash, I have long been concerned that too many
Internet-connected devices are being sold without appropriate
safeguards and protections in place,” said Sen. Warner. “This
legislation would establish thorough, yet flexible, guidelines for
Federal Government procurements of connected devices. My
hope is that this legislation will remedy the obvious market

202. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111; see also Mark Warner et al., supra note 199.
203. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, supra note
111.
204. Id.
205. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111.
206. Id.
207. Mark Warner et al., supra note 199.
208. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111; see also Kirtley, supra note 196.
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failure that has occurred and encourage device manufacturers to
compete on the security of their products.”209
Sen. Gardner agreed, saying,
The Internet of Things (IoT) landscape continues to expand, with most
experts expecting tens of billions of devices operating on our networks
within the next several years[.]As these devices continue to transform
our society and add countless new entry points into our networks, we
need to make sure they are secure from malicious cyber-attacks. This
bipartisan, commonsense legislation will ensure the federal
government leads by example and purchases devices that meet basic
requirements to prevent hackers from penetrating our government
systems without halting the life-changing innovations that continue
to develop in the IoT space.210

An August 2, 2017 Business Insider commentary noted that
the legislation is “limited” because “[i]t only applies to vendors
supplying the US federal government.”211 However, the article
also cited Ray O’Farrell, chief technology officer at cloud
computing firm VMware, who contended that the bill “includes
‘reasonable security recommendations’ that would be important
to improve protection of federal government networks.”212 Reed
Smith LLP associate Sarah Wronsky and partner Lawrence
Block also noted that despite the bill being limited in its scope,
it still represents an important step to address IoT security.213
“Although the bill does not apply to consumer devices, industry
experts anticipate the proposed legislation is a stepping stone to
broader regulation of security and privacy in all IoT devices,”
Wronsky and Block wrote in an August 11 commentary for the
Global Regulatory Enforcement Law Blog.214 “Despite its rapid
increase in procurement of IoT devices, the government has yet
to adequately address critical issues, including risk and
uncertainty about privacy and security of the devices.”215 As of

209. Press Release, U.S. Senator for Virginia Mark R. Warner, supra note
111.
210. Id.
211. Rob Price, US Lawmakers Are Trying to Fix the Security Nightmare
That Is the ‘Internet of Things’, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-senators-to-introduce-bill-to-secureinternet-of-things-2017-8.
212. Id.
213. Wronsky & Block, supra note 198.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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February 2018, the Senate bill remained in committee, with a
companion bill promised in the House of Representatives.216
4. U.S. House of Representatives Bill
In October 2017, several U.S. Representatives also took aim
at regulating IoT devices, though in this case specifically
targeting medical devices, or Internet of Medical Things (IoMT).
Rep. David Trott (R-Mich.) introduced H.R. 3985, the “Internet
of Medical Things Resilience Partnership Act of 2017,” which
was first co-sponsored by Rep. Susan Brooks (R-Ind.) then by
Rep. Erik Paulsen (R-Minn.) and Rep. Daniel Donovan (RN.Y.).217 Referred to the Subcommittee on Health, the bill’s
purpose is to “establish a working group of public and private
entities led by the Food and Drug Administration to recommend
voluntary frameworks and guidelines to increase the security
and resilience of Internet of Medical Things devices, and for
other purposes.”218
The bill requires the Commissioner of the FDA, in
consultation with the NIST, to establish the working group,
which will help create a report to be submitted to Congress. The
report would be required to include:
(1) an identification of existing cybersecurity standards, guidelines,
frameworks, and best practices that are applicable to mitigate
vulnerabilities in the devices described in subsection (a); (2) an
identification of existing and developing international and domestic
cybersecurity standards, guidelines, frameworks, and best practices
that mitigate vulnerabilities in such devices; (3) a specification of
high-priority gaps for which new or revised standards are needed; and
(4) potential action plans by which such gaps can be addressed.219

The NIST, an agency under the U.S. Department of
Commerce, has previously drafted numerous documents,
models, and more providing guidance related to cybersecurity

216. Shaun Waterman, How Congress Could Handle Cybersecurity-Focused
Bills in 2018, CYBERSCOOP (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com
/congress-2018-cybersecurity-outlook/.
217. Internet of Medical Things Resilience Partnership Act of 2017, H.R.
3985, 115th Cong. (2017); see also H.R. 3985—Internet of Medical Things
Resilience Partnership Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov
/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3985/cosponsors (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
218. H.R. 3985; see also Segura et al., supra note 78.
219. H.R. 3985, § 2(c).
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and IoT, all of which are available on their website.220 If H.R.
3985 is eventually passed, or perhaps even if it is not, the NIST,
as well as the FDA, will continue to be involved in drafting
policies, recommendations, reports, and more related to IoT
devices, including IoMT.
B. PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES SELF-REGULATION
Although some experts have demanded that the federal
government address and regulate the IoT, others have called on
private companies to engage in self-regulation. Larry Karisny,
the director of ProjectSafety.org, an organization that finds,
tests, and deploys solutions for cyber security,221 argues that it
would be more advantageous for the IoT industry to self-regulate
given that IoT suppliers and venture capitalist startups are
“clearly aware” that they have to address the security and
privacy issues of IoT devices or risk losing customers, spending
money on regulatory issues, or facing legal action.222 He also
contends that the IoT industry is already the one “moving
cybersecurity forward.”223
On October 23, 2017, Engadget reported that Google, Sprint,
and other companies were backing UK mobile chip designer
ARM’s new security framework called Platform Security
Architecture (PSA).224 The goal of the project is to create a
common industry framework and security foundation for every
IoT device.225 According to ARM, 100 billion IoT devices already
use its designs, with another 100 billion expected by 2021.226
PSA is comprised of “threat models, security analyses, hardware
and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source
firmware reference implementation,” which, collectively,
“provide[] a recipe” for security to be consistently designed into

220. NIST Initiatives in IoT, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/nist-initiatives-iot (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018).
221. About, PROJECT SAFETY, https://www.projectsafety.org/about (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
222. Karisny, supra note 62.
223. Id.
224. Steve Dent, Google and Others Back Internet of Things Security Push,
ENGADGET (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/23/google-arminternet-of-things-security/.
225. See id.
226. Id.
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IoT devices at the hardware and firmware levels.227 The
framework therefore applies to the entire IoT industry and to all
IoT devices, according to ARM.228
In an October 23, 2017 “SiliconANGLE” blog post, senior
staff writer Mike Wheatley explained that ARM’s proposal
would address three problems associated with the IoT: first, that
IoT devices “cannot easily be updated with new software to patch
known vulnerabilities.”229 Second, PSA could address the
problem that IoT devices come with default security credentials
and generic usernames and passwords, which most consumers
neglect to change or do not know that they need to change.230
Finally, the initiative could address that most IoT devices store
and send private data in plain-text format, which makes it easier
to obtain if a device is compromised.231
Wheatley also contended that industry analysts, in addition
to several large corporations, supported ARM’s proposal.232 He
quoted Patrick Moorhead, president and principal analyst at
research firm Moor Insights & Strategy, who said:
[b]road-based IoT deployment will require a fundamental rethinking
on security and I think ARM’s industry proposal has a lot of merit . . . .
Securing a trillion end points make security mandatory, not optional,
and ARM’s proposal contemplates many of the most aggressive
surface attack points and also provides a way to update the silicon in
the future for new kinds of attacks.233

On January 17, 2018, Business Wire reported that another
company was seeking to improve security of the IoT.234 VDOO, a
cybersecurity company, which says that it aims to become the

227. Platform Security Architecture, ARM, https://developer.arm.com
/products/architecture/platform-security-architecture (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
228. Id.
229. Mike Wheatley, Arm Unveils Plan to Secure the “Internet of Things”
Inside the Chip, SILICONANGLE (Oct. 23, 2017), https://siliconangle
.com/blog/2017/10/23/arm-unveils-platform-security-architecture-secureinternet-things/.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Matt Burke, With $13M in Initial Funding, VDOO Aims to Secure the
Internet of Things (IoT), BUS. WIRE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www
.businesswire.com/news/home/20180117005711/en/13M-Initial-FundingVDOO-Aims-Secure-Internet; see also Solutions, VDOO, https://www.vdoo.com
/solutions.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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“Security Authority of IoT devices,”235 announced it had raised
$13 million in initial funding to develop the company’s IoT
security platform.236 The platform is intended to provide an
automated process that analyzes gaps in devices’ security and
subsequently delivers the approximate security requirements
and implementation guidance based on the analysis.237 The
platform would also provide security certification for nearly all
IoT devices.238 Netanel Davidi, Co-CEO and founder of VDOO,
claims that:
[t]he problem is that there are no actionable processes or standards to
guide IoT makers in the implementation of the proper security for
each specific device. VDOO helps IoT makers protect their customers,
by enabling them to set and implement the right security for each of
their devices, in a quick and balanced manner.239

In a January 31, 2018 post on her blog, Stacey
Higginbotham, the former Senior Editor of Fortune, states that
she “like[s] VDOO’s idea of trying to protect devices before they
head out in the field in a scalable way.”240 She also notes,
however, that VDOO faces several challenges, including that it
is a “tall order” to ensure that “once a vulnerability is found, the
[IoT] device gets updated and all devices in the field get
patched.”241
Higginbotham also notes that another startup, Armis, is
attempting to improve IoT security from the “end-user
perspective” by offering a subscription-based software that
monitors the devices in a corporate or factory network.242 If a
device demonstrates security vulnerabilities or other problems,
235. About VDOO, VDOO, https://www.vdoo.com/about.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2018).
236. Burke, supra note 234.
237. Id.; see also Lindsey O’Donnell, IoT Security Startup VDOO Nabs $13M
in Funding, with Former Palo Alto Networks Channel Exec Heading Up Partner
Program Strategy, CRN (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.crn.com/news/internet-ofthings/300098141/iot-security-startup-vdoo-nabs-13m-in-funding-with-formerpalo-alto-networks-channel-exec-heading-up-partner-program-strategy.htm.
238. Burke, supra note 234.
239. Id.
240. Stacey Higginbotham, Two Startups and Two Approaches to IoT
Security, STACEY ON IOT (Jan. 31, 2018), https://staceyoniot.com/two-startupsand-two-approaches-to-iot-security/.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also Armis Launches from Stealth to Eliminate IoT Security
Blind
Spot
for
Enterprises,
PR NEWSWIRE
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/armis-launches-from-stealth-toeliminate-iot-security-blind-spot-for-enterprises-300469178.html.
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Armis’ software sends information to other security programs
used by the company or it attempts to shut down the problematic
equipment.243
IV. REGULATION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Meanwhile, the European Union and the Article 29 Working
Party have also taken action directly and indirectly affecting the
IoT, including issuing position papers and an opinion,244 as well
as passing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and
ePrivacy Regulation,245 though questions remain about how the
new regulations will affect the IoT. These regulations
demonstrate the different approaches taken by the EU and the
United States. The EU uses an omnibus approach, providing
Europeans with certain rights of privacy across all platforms and
sectors. The United States has a “patchwork quilt” of privacy
laws applying to different industries.246 Moreover, under the
First Amendment, United States law typically balances privacy
rights and interests against freedom of expression, whereas the
EU contends that privacy is a fundamental right, and the use of
personal data by third parties should be subject to regulation,
controls, and transparency, requiring government oversight.
A. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY PUBLISHES INTERNET OF THINGS
OPINION; EUROPEAN UNION PUBLISHES POSITION PAPERS
In September 2014, the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, which provides independent advice on data protection
matters to the European Commission and helps develop data
protection policies in the EU Member States, published “Opinion

243. Id.
244. See generally Article 29 Working Party, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/news-overview.cfm.
245. See IoT Regulation: IoT, GDPR, ePrivacy Regulation and More
Regulations, I-SCOOP (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.i-scoop.eu/internet-of-thingsguide/iot-regulation/; Proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation, EUR. COMM’N (Jan.
10, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-eprivacyregulation; Jane E. Kirtley, EU Proposes ePrivacy Regulation, in PRACTISING L.
INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 576–79 (2017); EU
ePrivacy Regulation, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROF. (2017), https://iapp.org
/resources/topics/eu-eprivacy-regulation/.
246. Singer, supra note 17.
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8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the IoT.”247 In particular,
the Working Party raised six particular concerns related to IoT
devices, including “lack of control and information
asymmetry,”248 “low-quality consent,”249 “extrapolation of
inferences from data and repurposing of original processing,”250
“intrusive identification of behaviour [sic] patterns and user
profiling,”251 “limitations on the possibility of remaining
anonymous whilst using services,”252 and “security risks,”253
such as cyberattacks.254 The opinion also addressed how
different EU laws would apply to the processing of personal data
by IoT devices and the different parties within the IoT

247. European Commission, Opinion 8/2014 on the on [sic] Recent
Developments on the Internet of Things, 14/EN WP 223 (Sept. 16, 2014),
www.dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument?id=1088 (stating that new
proposals will strengthen individual rights and tackle the challenges of
globalization and new technologies); see also The Internet of Things and Privacy
in Europe and the USA, TAYLOR WESSING (Mar. 2015), https://unitedkingdom.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article_wp29_iot.html (stating that
Opinion 8/2014 will provide data protection through its discussion and analysis
on a variety of subjects: wearable technology, quantified self, and home
automation (domotics), information asymmetry, low-quality consent, data
repurposing, intrusive identification of behavior patterns and user profiling,
and security risks).
248. Internet of Things and Privacy in Europe and the USA, supra note 247
(stating that “lack of control and information asymmetry” is “the
communication between individuals, devices and backend systems resulting in
the generation, storage and sharing of certain IoT-pushed data over which the
end user has no control”).
249. Id. (“Many IoT devices do not contain an obvious point at which the end
user can give consent and, even more difficult, many IoT-related services do not
give any alternatives to the end user’s personal data being created, stored or
shared. In these situations, there must be new ways of obtaining a valid consent
from the end user (e.g. privacy proxies or ‘sticky policies’ which stay with the
data regardless of which party has access to it).”).
250. Id. (stating that “extrapolation of inferences from data and repurposing
of original processing” is the disclosure of raw data to third-parties and the
“regeneration of data for new purposes can easily go beyond the purposes for
which the data was originally collected”).
251. Id. (defining “intrusive identification of behaviour [sic] patterns and
user profiling” as certain private behaviors and habits becoming unwantedly
identifiable through the use of the IoT).
252. Id. (“Wearing IoT objects that are close to the data subjects results in a
range of identifiers being available (e.g. MAC addresses) with re-identification
of anonymi[z]ed data also an issue.”).
253. Id. (stating a “security risk” can make the date vulnerable to being
attacked at various points, including at the communication link and storage
infrastructure levels).
254. European Commission, supra note 247.
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industry.255 Finally, the Working Party addressed the
obligations imposed on IoT stakeholders, as well as the rights of
data subjects.256 Ultimately, the Working Party concluded that
although the IoT presents several benefits for users and IoT
companies, the privacy and security challenges must also be
followed closely, requiring IoT devices to have “legal and
technical compliance.”257 The Working Party also intended the
opinion to “contribute to the uniform application of the legal data
protection framework in the IoT as well as to the development of
a high level of protection with regard to the protection of
personal data in the EU.”258
In December 2016, the European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA) led an initiative resulting in
the issuance of position papers on IoT security.259 Joined by
semiconductor manufacturing companies Infineon Technologies,
NXP Semiconductors, and STMicroelectronics, ENISA cited
concerns that a European market failure for cybersecurity and
privacy “creates a severe risk that the European economy is
falling behind in its ability to tap into the promising emerging
IoT markets.”260 The papers concluded that there is “no basic
level, no level zero defined for the security and privacy of
connected and smart devices,” nor are there any legal
guidelines.261 Thus, the agency contended that it is necessary to
define the European Baseline Requirements for Security and
Privacy in a way that “minimizes risk, is neutral in technological
terms, and remains open to innovation.”262
The top priorities outlined in the papers were related to the
development of baseline requirements for IoT security and
privacy.263 ENISA and the manufacturers agreed that any
existing and new EU regulation should take standards
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Ofer Amitai, Growing Regulation of IoT Security, IOT J. (2017),
http://www.iotjournal.com/articles/view?17024/2; see also Common Position on
Cybersecurity, ENISA (Dec. 2016), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications
/enisa-position-papers-and-opinions/infineon-nxp-st-enisa-position-oncybersecurity/view.
260. Common Position on Cybersecurity, ENISA, supra note 259, at 1.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See generally id.
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developed and supported by EU stakeholders into account.264 As
the following sections will suggest, the GDPR and ePrivacy
Regulation may have implications for the IoT.265 The papers also
emphasized the need for EU Member States’ existing security
processes and services to be evaluated and adapted to IoT
devices, eventually leading to certification of the processes.266 In
addition to analyzing and developing standard IoT
requirements, the papers also called for greater awareness of EU
citizens, organizations, and companies regarding security and
privacy of the IoT.267
ENISA further advocates that baseline requirements of IoT
security and privacy must be effective in all areas of the IoT
industry, from components to complex systems.268 The papers
also called for appropriate training in schools, universities, and
industry, a “level playing field” for all stakeholders, risk
management practices, and more.269
Since the publication of the Working Party’s opinion and
ENISA’s process papers in 2016, an EU organization, a
European organization, and a European initiative have been
developed to address the security and privacy concerns
stemming from the IoT. The Alliance for Internet of Things
Innovation (AIOTI) was initiated as a result of the European and
global IoT technology and market developments.270 According to
its website, AIOTI “aims to create and master sustainable
innovative European IoT ecosystems in the global context to

264. Id. at 1–2.
265. See IoT Regulation: IoT, GDPR, ePrivacy Regulation and More
Regulations, I-SCOOP, (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.i-scoop.eu/internet-ofthings-guide/iot-regulation/.
266. Common Position on Cybersecurity, ENISA, supra note 259, at 3
(stating that current processes should be built on defined baseline security
requirements and existing internationally recognized certification schemes. If
the European Commission defined a policy framework for ensuring minimal
security requirement for connected devices, the development of security
standards would become more efficient and adapt to new circumstances related
to IoT).
267. Id. (“There is a lack of awareness when it comes to security and privacy
in IoT. Industry, especially SME, needs to be provided with information about
existing security features such as encryption, appropriate key storage, strong
authentication, privacy and identity management systems.”).
268. Id. at 1.
269. Id. at 4.
270. More About AIOTI, ALLIANCE FOR INTERNET OF THINGS INNOVATION,
https://aioti.eu/learn-more-about-aioti/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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address the challenges of IoT technology and applications
deployment including standardisation [sic], interoperability and
policy issues.”271 The European Research Cluster on the Internet
of Things (IERC) is a separate organization that aims to
“address the large potential for IoT-based capabilities in Europe
and to coordinate the convergence of ongoing activities.”272 The
group aims to foster communication and coordination between
different IoT projects throughout Europe.273
A third European organization seeking to promote the IoT
is the IoT-European Platforms Initiative (IoT-EPI), a collection
of seven research and innovation projects related to the IoT.274
The initiative, which has total funding of 50 M€ and a partner
network of 120 established companies, is intended to develop
innovative platform technologies and foster technology
adoption.275 The organization also holds special events meant to
foster networking amongst IoT companies and other
organizations.276
B. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IMPLICATIONS
As alluded to above, experts contend that the GDPR may
have implications for the IoT, though questions remain about
how the provisions of these regulations will apply to IoT devices
in practice. On April 27, 2016, the European Union (EU)
formally adopted the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)277 to replace the Data Protection Directive.278 The
GDPR, which becomes effective on May 25, 2018, creates new
responsibilities and obligations for data controllers and
processors, while seeking to provide a clearer legal environment
in which EU companies can operate.279 The EU estimated that
this will save businesses a collective €2.3 billion ($2.7 billion) a
271. Id.
272. About IERC, EUR. RESEARCH CLUSTER ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS,
http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
273. Id.
274. About IoT-EPI, IOT-EUROPEAN PLATFORMS INITIATIVE, http://iotepi.eu/about/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 2016 O.J. (L 119).
278. 1995 O.J. (L 281); see also Jane E. Kirtley, EU Continues
Implementation Process for General Data Protection Regulation, in PRACTISING
L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 567–72 (2017).
279. 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 14.
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year.280 The regulation also aims to expand the privacy rights of
EU citizens, providing them more control over their personal
data.281
The GDPR applies to both “controllers” and “processors” of
data.282 A data controller is the person, organization, or business
that determines how and why personal data is processed,
whereas a data processor is the person or entity that processes
personal data on behalf of the data controller.283 The GDPR
defines processing as “any operation or set of operations which
is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data,
whether or not by automated means, such as collection,
recording, organization [etc.]”284 The GDPR applies to a company
if it has a branch, office, subsidiary, or other establishment or
partnership in the EU that collects, receives, transmits, uses,
stores or otherwise processes personal data.285 The GDPR will
also apply both when a company offers goods or services to
individuals in the EU and when a company collects any
information that is considered personal identifiable
information.286 Controllers are responsible for ensuring that
their processors abide by data protection laws.287
Experts agree that there are several requirements in the
GDPR that may have implications on the IoT industry. For
example, the GDPR requires companies or organizations to
conduct Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) when
data processing “‘is likely to result in a high risk to the rights
and freedoms of natural persons.’”288 Given the high security and

280. European Commission Press Release Memo/17/1441, Questions and
Answers – Data Protection Reform Package (May 24, 2017).
281. 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 14.
282. Id.; see also Jane E. Kirtley, EU Continues Implementation Process for
General Data Protection Regulation, in PRACTISING L. INST., COMMUNICATIONS
LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2017, at 567–72 (2017).
283. Am I a ‘Data Controller’ or a ‘Data Processor’, and Why Is It Important
Anyway?, OSBORNE CLARKE (May 31, 2016), http://www.osborneclarke.com
/insights/am-i-a-data-controller-or-a-data-processor-and-why-is-it-importantanyway/.
284. 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(2).
285. Id. at art. 4(7).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Data Protection Impact Assessments Under the GDPR, IT
GOVERNANCE,
https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/data-protection-impactassessment-dpia (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); see also IoT Regulation: IoT, GDPR,
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privacy risks associated with the IoT, this requirement of the
GDPR is likely to apply to IoT companies.
Second, the GDPR requires that data breaches be reported
if personal data is involved, such as in DDoS and ransomware
cyberattacks. Companies dealing with personal data must be
able to identify and deal with security breaches, in addition to
creating a mandatory notification system in the event of any
breaches of personal data.289
Third, the GDPR outlines several requirements for how
personal data is stored, either in the cloud or in-house hardware,
and requires IoT companies to follow these provisions.290
A fourth area arises for the IoT in GDPR requirements that
an individual’s consent be obtained to process their personal
data. Under the GDPR, silence or inactivity do not constitute
valid consent; the data subject must agree to the data processing
through an affirmative act.291 Additionally, the GDPR states
that children under age 13 cannot give consent, and children
between 13 and 15 are subject to EU Member States’ particular
laws.292 As a result, IoT companies who create and/or market IoT
devices for children have additional mandatory considerations
regarding consent.
Finally, the GDPR stipulates that data subjects have a
right, at any time, to be informed about how their personal data
is used and to whom it is disclosed.293 IoT devices present
additional technologies that can lead a data controller to
potentially lose track of the information.294
C. EPRIVACY REGULATION IMPLICATIONS
An additional framework that experts generally agree will
have implications for the IoT is the ePrivacy Regulation, though
ePrivacy Regulation and More Regulations, I-SCOOP (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.i-scoop.eu/internet-of-things-guide/iot-regulation/.
289. Internet of Things Privacy: What GDPR Means for IoT Data, LANNER
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.lanner-america.com/knowledgebase/iot/internetthings-privacy-gdpr-iot-data-protection/.
290. Id.
291. Laura Vegh, The Internet of Things in the Era of the GDPR, EU GDPR
COMPLIANT (Oct. 24, 2017), https://eugdprcompliant.com/internet-of-thingsera-of-gdpr/.
292. Id.; see also Internet of Things Privacy: What GDPR Means for IoT Data,
supra note 289.
293. Vegh, supra note 291.
294. Id.
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the full effects have yet to be seen. On January 10, 2017, the
European Commission adopted the ePrivacy Regulation, which
is meant to complement the existing ePrivacy Directive.295 The
directive, adopted in 2002 to address issues raised by the 1995
Data Protection Directive—a framework that governed the
collection, processing, and use of personal data—was intended to
protect EU citizens’ privacy and confidentiality rights as they
used electronic communication services, as well as to regulate
how telecommunications companies could use EU individuals’
data.296 The proposed ePrivacy Regulation extends coverage
from telecommunication companies and internet service
providers (ISPs) to include any company processing personal
data.297
Additionally, the ePrivacy Regulation is intended to
consolidate EU Member States’ implementation of the law’s
protections and align it with the GDPR.298 The move marks an
additional step in the European Commission’s attempts to
harmonize data protection across the EU because regulations
have binding legal force throughout every EU member state.299
Conversely, EU directives require member states to adopt their
own laws that implement the desired specific outcomes of the
directive, which often results in variations across EU member
states.300
Several experts point out that the ePrivacy Regulation
“clearly” or “explicitly” mentions the IoT, specifically Recital 1,
which states “the principle of confidentiality should apply to
current and future means of communication,”301 and Recital 12,
which reads, “Connected devices and machines increasingly

295. Proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-eprivacy-regulation; see
also EU Proposes ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 245.
296. See generally 2002 O.J. (L 201).
297. Rohan Massey, European Union: Thoughts On EU’s Draft E-Privacy
Regulation, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/910235
/thoughts-on-eu-s-draft-e-privacy-regulation.
298. EU ePrivacy Regulation, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROF. (2017),
https://iapp.org/resources/topics/eu-eprivacy-regulation/.
299. Id.
300. Difference Between a Regulation, Directive, and Decision, USDA (Dec.
21, 2016), http://www.usda-eu.org/eu-basics-questions/difference-between-aregulation-directive-and-decision/.
301. IoT Regulation: IoT, GDPR, ePrivacy Regulation and More Regulations,
supra note 245.

500

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 19:2

communicate with each other by using electronic
communications networks. . . . In order to ensure full protection
of
the
rights
to
privacy
and
confidentiality
of
communications . . . it is necessary to clarify that this
Regulation should apply to the transmission of machine-tomachine communications.”302 Additionally, provisions regarding
the processing of communications data and consent
requirements could also apply to IoT devices, though experts
remain unsure about how great of an effect the regulation will
have and what the implications will be.303
V. LIABILITY
According to a Mason Hayes & Curran May 2016 blog post,
there are two main areas where liability can arise with IoT
devices: a device malfunction and cyberattacks or hacks that
lead to theft of personal data stored on the device or a larger
network.304 The question arises in each of these cases: who is
liable?305 So far, experts agree that this is largely unanswered.306
However, several existing legal and regulatory concepts suggest
how liability might be determined and handled with the IoT,
including (1) enforcement actions by the FTC related to IoT
devices, including those mentioned earlier section in this article,
(2) End User License Agreements (EULAs) and product liability
law, and (3) additional avenues, beyond product liability, that
consumers may use to claim compensation for damages related
to IoT devices.

302. EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM A8–0324/2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2017-0324&language=EN; see
also Study on the Impact of the Proposed ePrivacy Regulation, HÄRTING (Oct.
19, 2017), https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281
/epr_-_gutachten-final-4.0_3_.pdf.
303. David Meyer, Why the IoT Industry Needs to Pay Attention to ePrivacy
Regulation, INTERNET OF BUS. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://internetofbusiness.com
/iot-industry-needs-pay-attention-eprivacy-regulation/; see also Study on the
Impact of the Proposed ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 302.
304. Untangling the Web of Liability in the Internet of Things, MASON HAYES
AND CURRAN TECH LAW BLOG (May 19, 2016), https://www.mhc.ie
/latest/blog/untangling-the-web-of-liability-in-the-internet-of-things.
305. Id.; Michael Kassner, IoT and Liability: Who Pays When Things Go
Wrong?, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.techrepublic.com/article
/iot-and-liability-who-pays-when-things-go-wrong/.
306. E.g., Untangling the Web of Liability in the Internet of Things, supra
note 305.
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A. EXTRAPOLATING FROM FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
FTC enforcement actions related to IoT devices may predict
potential liability considerations for the IoT. In its complaints
against ASUS, D-Link, Lenovo, Vizio, and VTech, the FTC made
several claims under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), which makes “unfair and deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce” unlawful.307
According to the Federal Reserve’s Consumer Compliance
Handbook, Section 5(a), acts or practices are considered
deceptive where “(1) a representation, omission, or practice
misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) a consumer’s
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is
considered reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the
misleading representation, omission, or practice is material.”308
Acts or practices are considered unfair if they “cause[] or are
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”309
One particular claim raised by the FTC in its enforcement
actions was that an IoT company practiced “misrepresentation”
when it failed to take “reasonable steps to ensure security.” For
example, in its complaint against D-Link, the FTC alleged that
the company “[failed] to take reasonable steps to secure the
routers and Internet-protocol cameras they designed for,
marketed, and sold to United States consumers.”310 In its
complaint against VTech, the FTC alleged that the company
maintained in its privacy policy that most personal information
was encrypted, when, in fact, it was not.311 Similarly, the FTC
claimed in several enforcement actions that IoT devices had

307. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
308. FED. RES., FTCA § 5 UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES, at 1
(2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 45.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
310. D-Link Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 1.
311. VTech Complaint, supra note 161, ¶ 12.
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“vulnerabilities,”312 inadequate security measures,313 and
insecure designs.314
Second, the FTC also alleged in several of these cases that
consumers were not notified of security breaches or of updates
or patches that became available to improve security of IoT
devices. For example, in its complaint against Vizio, the FTC
alleged that the company “failed to adequately disclose that the
‘Smart Interactivity’ feature comprehensively collected and
shared consumers’ television viewing activity.”315
Third, the FTC emphasized the security risks associated
with users’ personal data, such as in the case against Lenovo in
which the FTC alleged that the company “created two significant
security vulnerabilities” because the users’ internet browser had
access to “all of a consumer’s sensitive personal information that
was transmitted on the Internet, such as login credentials,
Social Security numbers, financial account information, medical
information, and web-based email communications.”316 In the
case against VTech, the FTC alleged that the company had
violated COPPA, which protects children’s personal data.317
Because the Commission enforces a variety of specific consumer
protection statutes, it is possible it will attempt to make IoT
companies liable for laws beyond COPPA, such as HIPAA,
among others.
Finally, the FTC alleged in each of its enforcement actions
listed above that consumers had been injured or harmed as a
result of the unfair practices by the technology companies. The
FTC alleged that ASUS “subjected consumers to substantial
injury”318 and that Lenovo’s practice of collection and sharing of
sensitive data without consumers’ consent has “caused or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”319
However, although the FTC alleged in its complaint against
D-Link that the company’s practices “caused, or are likely to

312. ASUSTek Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 3; Lenovo Complaint, supra
note 148, ¶ 11.
313. VTech Complaint, supra note 161.
314. ASUSTek Complaint, supra note 125, ¶ 15.
315. Vizio Complaint, supra note 154, ¶ 38.
316. Lenovo Complaint, supra note 148, at ¶ 6 and 11.
317. VTech Complaint, supra note 161, at ¶ 17.
318. ASUSTek Complaint, supra note 125, at ¶ 35.
319. Lenovo Complaint, supra note 148, at ¶ 37.
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cause, substantial injury to consumers in the United States,”320
Judge Donato rejected this claim, ruling that the FTC needed to
be more specific in tying its claims about a company’s
misrepresentations of IoT product security to evidence of
concrete harm to consumers.321
Experts contended throughout 2017 that the FTC may, in
fact, be shifting towards a “concrete harms” approach in its data
security enforcement actions. While serving as acting
Chairwoman of the FTC, Maureen K. Ohlhausen was one of two
commissioners who were critical of the FTC’s decisions to bring
enforcement actions alleging unfair data security practices
against companies in situations when consumer harm was not
clearly apparent.322 In January 2017, Ohlhausen dissented from
the agency’s filing of a complaint against D-Link, contending
that the focus of FTC action should be a showing of tangible
harm prior to taking enforcement action and that part of
“regulatory humility” is to foster both business innovation and
privacy innovation.323
In a February 2017 speech before the American Bar
Association, Ohlhausen contended that her leadership of the
FTC would focus on enforcement actions in which concrete
harms could be alleged.324 “The FTC should focus enforcement
on matters where consumers are harmed or where companies
don’t keep their promises,” Ohlhausen said during the speech.
“The agency should focus on cases with properly and objectively
determined concrete harms such as diminished or disrupted

320. D-Link Complaint, supra note 134, at ¶ 29.
321. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 2017 WL 4150873, at *5
(N.D. Calif. 2017).
322. See Glenn G. Lammi, FTC Must Refocus on Harm to Consumers and
Competition, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2017, 2:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf
/2017/03/08/ftc-must-refocus-on-harm-to-consumers-andcompetition/#6ad3376a5c11 (the other being former Commissioner Joshua
Wright).
323. Allison Grande, New FTC Chair to Shift Data Security Focus to Actual
Harm, LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2017, 9:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/885212/new-ftc-chair-to-shift-data-security-focus-to-actual-harm.
324. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Opening Keynote at ABA 2017 Consumer Protection Coference (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1069803/mko_a
ba_consumer_protection_conference.pdf; see also James R. Hood, Trump
Appointee Sees Overreach in Earlier FTC Actions, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Feb. 8,
2017),
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/ftcs-new-head-eyes-harmsbased-approach-to-privacy-protection-020817.html.
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competition, monetary injury, and unwarranted health and
safety risks.”325
By focusing on concrete harms, Ohlhausen promised “to
deepen the FTC’s understanding of the economics of
privacy . . . includ[ing] studying consumer preferences and the
relationship between access to consumer information and
innovation.”326 She contended that concentrating on consumer
injury will allow the FTC to be more selective and better allocate
its limited resources. During her February 2017 speech,
Ohlhausen said, “for every consumer protection case the FTC
brings, we must ensure that we seek and obtain for consumers
relief that is tied to consumer injury.”327
Ohlhausen drew a distinction between a “notice-and-choice
approach” to privacy protection and a “harms-based
approach.”328 The “notice-and-choice” approach, generally
favored by the FTC under President Barack Obama, gave
consumers the choice to “opt out” of sharing certain types of
information, such as Personal Identifiable Information (PII).
The “harms-based” approach, on the other hand, seeks to protect
consumers only from privacy breaches that are harmful.329
On April 4, 2017 Consumer Affairs reported that Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) staff attorney Sophia Cope claimed
the harms-based approach “is exactly what companies have been
hoping for.”330 “It removes consumer choice and control over
their privacy,” Cope wrote in an email to Consumer Affairs,331
Now bureaucrats get to decide that certain data practices are not
harmful, even if they include collecting highly sensitive information
about people and what they do online, engaging in non-stop online
surveillance, monetizing that information for commercial gain, and
sharing that information with numerous unknown parties.
Consumers deserve better from the FTC.332

325. Orson Swindle, Why President Trump Should Choose Maureen
Ohlhausen to Lead the FTC, HILL (Feb. 2, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://originnyi.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/320468-why-presidenttrump-should-choose-maureen-ohlhausen-to.
326. Ohlhausen, supra note 324.
327. Id.
328. Hood, supra note 324.
329. Swindle, supra note 325.
330. Hood, supra note 324.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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In October 2017, President Donald Trump announced that
he would nominate Joseph Simons to replace Ohlhausen as the
new head of the FTC, as well as naming three additional
nominees to the agency.333 Simons previously served as a cochair of the antitrust practice at the law firm Paul Weiss, where
his clients included Microsoft and Sony, among other technology
companies.334 Simons also served as the FTC’s competition
bureau under President George W. Bush.
According to The Washington Post on October 19, 2017,
some policy analysts, including Berin Szoka, president of the
think tank TechFreedom, argued that Simons’ first task should
be to clarify how the FTC communicates its expectations to
companies involved in data security. In response to a question
posed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation asking what he felt to be the top three challenges
facing the FTC, Simons stated that one such challenge was that
“[r]apid changes in technology and cyber threats provide a
significant challenge to the Agency’s ability to fulfill its
consumer protection mission and provide meaningful guidance
to the business community.”335 Simons argued that the FTC
must continue to protect consumers despite these challenges,
which would likely include IoT devices. He said, “It is critical,
despite these challenges, that the FTC protect consumers
without unduly burdening them or interfering with the ability of
firms (especially small firms and new entrants) to use data to
enhance competition.”336 Thus, although he did not explicitly
333. Brian Fung, Trump’s Pick for a Top Consumer Watchdog Once
Represented Microsoft and MasterCard, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/19/trumps-pickfor-a-top-consumer-watchdog-once-represented-microsoft-andmastercard/?utm_term=.7f6effad8fd8; see also Ashley Gold, et al., Trump Will
Nominate Joseph Simons for FTC Chair, POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/19/trump-simons-federal-tradecommission-243931.
334. Brian Fung, supra note 333.
335. JOSEPH SIMONS, STATEMENT ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL
INFORMATION FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6c4149af-3023-482590f1-3c38e279fd0d/6A0CCF409AF89DC8D5C0A84CE8730012.confidential—simons—-committee-questionnaire-redacted.pdf; see also Li Zhou, FTC
Confirmation Hearing Soon?, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.politico
.com/newsletters/morning-tech/2018/02/06/ftc-confirmation-hearing-soon094789.
336. JOSEPH SIMONS, supra note 335.
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discuss the IoT, Simons’ answer suggested that the FTC will
continue enforcement actions to protect consumers in the face of
cyber threats.
Ultimately, questions remain about whether the FTC will
continue enforcement actions against IoT companies if they
cannot prove concrete harm. Even if the agency does not take
this approach, Judge Donato’s decision in the D-Link case
problematizes the ability of the FTC to hold companies liable for
harms caused to consumers without concrete evidence. It is also
worth noting that the FTC actions described in this article are
not binding court verdicts, though they still represent,
potentially, the beginning of a standard for security in the IoT.337
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND END USER LICENSE
AGREEMENTS
Providing additional insight into liability related to the IoT,
product liability is an area of law in which manufacturers and
retailers are held responsible for damages caused by their
products’ failures.338 Liability claims fall into three categories:
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.339 Negligence
refers to liability where the product manufacturer’s conduct is
called into question, such as whether the company acted with a
lesser standard of care than someone in similar circumstances
would have exercised.340 Strict liability holds a manufacturer
responsible for the damages caused by its product, such as if it
was defective, whether related to design, manufacturing, or
packaging. A product may also be defective if the company failed
to provide an adequate warning to consumers.341 Finally,
breach-of-warranty cases arise when a manufacturer violates
the warranties it makes for a product.342

337. Lucas Amodio, Is the Internet of Things Ripe for Product Liability Law?,
LINKEDIN (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/internet-things-ripeproduct-liability-law-lucas-amodio-c-eh/.
338. Denis W. Stearns, An Introduction to Product Liability Law, MARLER
CLARK (2001), https://marlerclark.com/pdfs/intro-product-liability-law.pdf.
339. Products Liability: A Litigation Overview, SMITH, GAMBRELL &
RUSSELL (2013), http://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/2015/.
340. Negligence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex
/negligence (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
341. Products Liability: A Litigation Overview, supra note 339.
342. Id.
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For traditional devices, consumers can generally receive
compensation from manufacturers, suppliers, or sellers provided
they can demonstrate personal injury or property damage from
a defective product, such as a traditional refrigerator causing a
fire that burned down an individual’s home.343 However, this is
not the case for most IoT devices, largely due to EULAs, which
are contracts signed or accepted by consumers in order to use
their IoT products.344 Although IoT devices have the potential to
cause or lead to a range of harm, such as from a hacker
controlling a thermostat and turning off a homeowner’s heat in
the winter, causing pipes to freeze,345 EULAs “allow
manufacturers to disclaim most, if not all, liability for damages
incurred by the usage of IoT products.”346 Thus, EULAs and
software licenses make it very difficult, if not impossible, for
consumers to claim compensations when products fail or when
these types of damages occur.347
The challenge for consumers is that in order to gain full
access to all the functionalities of most IoT devices, they must
sign the software agreement or EULA, which is rarely
negotiable.348 Nest, a smart appliances vendor, for example,
employs a restrictive EULA that disclaims all liabilities for its
product’s failures, but requires users to sign the agreement in

343. Eireann Leverett, Time to Decide on Internet of Things Liability,
MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/privacy-international/time-todecide-on-internet-of-things-liability-c39cee0142ff.
344. Id.; see also Leta Gorman, The Era of the Internet of Things: Can
Product Liability Laws Keep Up?, DEF. COUNS. J., July 2017, 4,
https://www.iadclaw.org/securedocument.aspx?file=DCJArticles/The_Era_of_t
he_Internet_of_Things.pdf (suggesting that consumers may be “compelled to
sign a standard form agreement that automatically waived claims in order to
use the software that accompanied the product”).
345. Amodio, supra note 337.
346. Bao Kham Chau et al., Liability for Home IoT 2 (Dec. 2015)
(unpublished final paper, MIT), https://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes
/6.805/student-papers/fall15-papers/Liability%20for%20hone%20IoT.pdf;
see
also Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User’s Guide to EULAs, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 17, 2005), https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-termsusers-guide-eulas.
347. See Chau et al., supra note 346.
348. See Seth Stevenson, By Clicking on this Article, You Agree to . . . , SLATE
(Nov. 17, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology
/2014/11/end_user_license_agreements_does_it_matter_that_we_don_t_read_t
he_fine_print.html.
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order to use their smart thermostats.349 Consequently, the users
have entered into a contract with Nest in which they relinquish
the right to sue for damages caused by the thermostat.
Perhaps the only viable way for consumers to hold
manufacturers and others liable for damages caused by an IoT
device is by demonstrating that the contract was
“unconscionable.”350 In order for a contract to be deemed as such,
the user must show both procedural unfairness (“procedural
unconscionability”) and unfairness in substantive terms
(“substantive unconscionability”), “on a kind of sliding scale,
where a showing of greater unfairness on one means that less
unfairness need be shown on the other.”351 Generally, procedural
unconscionability relates to the process of making a contract and
includes unequal bargaining power or surprises in the contract
process, such as obscure language hidden in small print.352
Conversely, substantive unconscionability relates to the actual
terms of the contract being one-sided or overly harsh.353
However, there is to date no clear framework, nor court decision,
related to unconscionability of EULAs tied to IoT devices.354
Additional aspects of IoT devices further complicate product
liability.355 First, the complexity of IoT devices’ interconnectivity
“makes it much harder to establish who is liable under
traditional laws and regulations when something goes wrong.”356
Second, as Lucas Amodio, an intellectual property attorney at
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, contends, where data is compromised
by hacks, it is often hard to quantify the damage caused as
opposed to physical damages.357 The Mason Hayes & Curran
2016 blog post questions whether the aggrieved IoT user is
required to prove they have suffered damage or harm stemming
349. See End User License Agreement, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/eula/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
350. Chau et al., supra note 346.
351. BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 90–91
(2012).
352. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 383 (Linda Picard Wood ed.,
2016).
353. Id. at 474.
354. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things:
Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 842 (2016).
355. Kassner, supra note 305; Amodio, supra note 337.
356. Untangling the Web of Liability in the Internet of Things, supra note
304.
357. Amodio, supra note 337; Gorman, supra note 344.
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from an IoT company’s actions.358 One final consideration is
whether liability related to IoT devices should be criminal, civil
or both. The Mason Hayes & Curran post argues that the answer
depends on the severity of the harm.359
C. OTHER METHODS CONSUMERS CAN USE TO CLAIM
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES
Product liability lawsuits are not the only way consumers
can fight back when they suffer damages. Collective consumer
backlash could deter companies from creating faulty products in
the first place or discourage other consumers from buying the
products.360 Additionally, federal agencies, especially the FTC,
may undertake enforcement actions against companies who do
not adequately protect consumers’ security and privacy, leading
to settlements or other enforcement actions.361 The Mason Hayes
& Curran post also argues that an alternate approach to product
litigation would be for courts and legislators to consider
assigning liability between each actor in the IoT product and
network chain, regardless of their culpability.362 However, the
authors of the post concede that this not as simple as it sounds
because a court would be required to determine whether the
liability lies with the IoT companies or the actual hacker.363
For example, on October 21, 2015, the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade held a hearing on
“Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle and Roadway Safety.”364
The Subcommittee considered a legislative staff discussion draft
document that included multiple proposals intended to improve
motor vehicle safety processes and privacy practices among auto
manufacturers, and prepare the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the next generation of

358. Untangling the Web of Liability in the Internet of Things, supra note
304.
359. Id.; see also Kassner, supra note 305.
360. Chau et al., supra note 346, at 9.
361. Id.
362. Untangling the Web of Liability in the Internet of Things, supra note
304.
363. Id.
364. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 114TH
CONG., MEMO FOR HEARING ON EXAMINING WAYS TO IMPROVE VEHICLE AND
ROADWAY SAFETY (Oct. 2015), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17
/20151021/104070/HHRG-114-IF17-20151021-SD002.pdf.
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vehicles and innovation in the auto industry.365 One draft
measure proposed that car manufacturers be fined $5,000 a day
if they did not submit a detailed privacy policy to the
Department of Transportation.366 Under the draft legislation,
car manufacturers could be held liable if they violate any part of
their own privacy policies or if they fail to file a privacy policy in
the first place.367 However, “the maximum penalty automakers
face would be limited to $1 million, and they would be shielded
from Federal Trade Commission scrutiny for ‘unfair’ or
‘deceptive’ acts related to privacy as long as their privacy policies
meet all the legislation’s requirements,” thus creating a safe
harbor for manufacturers.368
One final recourse for consumers could be through state law,
specifically data disposal laws, security breach notification laws,
and general data security laws pertaining to the private
sector.369 According to the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL), data disposal laws, passed by at least 32
states, require entities to destroy, dispose of, or otherwise make
unreadable personal information.370
Conversely, security breach notification laws, enacted by 48
states and Washington, D.C., require private or governmental
entities to notify individuals of security breaches in which
personally identifiable information is implicated or
compromised.371 According to the NCSL, security breach laws
365. Id. (explaining the purpose of the memo in the introduction).
366. H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 114TH CONG., DISCUSSION
DRAFT OF A BILL FOR HEARING ON EXAMINING WAYS TO IMPROVE VEHICLE AND
ROADWAY SAFETY 22 (Oct. 2015), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17
/20151021/104070/BILLS-114pihDiscussionDraftonVehicleandRoadwaySafety.pdf.
367. Brian Fung, Lawmakers Want to Fine Carmakers $5,000 a Day for Not
Having a Privacy Policy, WASH. POST: SWITCH (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/10/19/lawmakerswant-to-fine-carmakers-5000-a-day-for-not-having-a-privacy-policy/.
368. Id.
369. Amy Talbott, Privacy Laws: How the US, EU and Others Protect IoT
Data (or Don’t), ZDNet (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.zdnet.com/article/privacylaws-how-the-us-eu-and-others-protect-iot-data-or-dont/.
370. Data Disposal Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1,
2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/data-disposal-laws.aspx.
371. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Feb.
6,
2018),
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/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notificationlaws.aspx.
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generally have provisions regarding “who must comply with the
law (e.g., businesses, data/ information brokers, government
entities, etc.); definitions of ‘personal information’ (e.g., name
combined with SSN, [driver’s] license or state ID, account
numbers, etc.); what constitutes a breach (e.g., unauthorized
acquisition of data); requirements for notice (e.g., timing or
method of notice, who must be notified); and exemptions (e.g.,
for encrypted information).”372
Thirteen states also have more general data security laws
that address other aspects of security, generally taking a more
preemptive or preventative approach.373 Most contain
requirements that businesses that own, license, or maintain
personal data must implement and maintain reasonable
security procedures, as well as protect personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or
disclosure.374 Massachusetts Regulation 201 CMR 17.00
provides an example of preemptive action in that it includes an
extensive list of protocols companies must implement into their
security architecture if they handle personal information.375
In a March 2016 special feature titled “Internet of Things:
The Security Challenge,” ZDNet contributor and TechRepublic
associate editor Amy Talbott noted that at least one state has a
law specifically addressing IoT devices—in this case, smart
TVs.376 She noted that California, which has comparably strong
data privacy laws, has a statute related to the security of IoT
televisions. Business & Professions Code sections 22948.20–
22948.25 prohibit a “person or entity [from] provid[ing] the
operation of a voice recognition feature within this state without
prominently informing, during the initial setup or installation of
a connected television, either the user or the person designated
by the user to perform the initial setup or installation of the

372. Id.
373. Data

Security Laws—Private Sector, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Dec.
5,
2017),
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also Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, PRACTICAL
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(July
1,
2017),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-502-0467
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374. Id.
375. Id.; see also 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2010).
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connected television.”377 The law also limits how recordings
collected by the remote can be used or distributed.378
Talbott also contended that these state privacy laws,
although most do not specifically mention the IoT, are generally
applicable to IoT devices because they frequently collect users’
personal data.379 However, a May 2017 article by FCW, which
provides federal technology executives with information, ideas,
and strategies, argues that its policymakers still must determine
whether new laws at the federal and state level are needed to
help ensure the security of IoT devices.380 He quotes Naomi
Lefkowitz, a senior privacy policy advisor at the NIST, who said
that “there will be no perfect privacy,” but that the IoT
“require[s] additional legislative solutions.”381
VI. CONCLUSION
In the concluding pages of E.M. Forster’s novella, The
Machine Stops,382 the human inhabitants of a dystopian
subterranean world discover that “the Machine,” the omnipotent
mechanical being upon which they depend for food, shelter,
communication, travel, and other elements necessary for life, is
breaking down. Although initially the Machine had been merely
a tool, subservient to its human masters, over time, “Humanity,
in its desire for comfort . . . [q]uietly and complacently, [] was
sinking into decadence, and progress had come to mean the
progress of the Machine.” Gradually, “all, save a few retrogrades,
worship[ped] it as divine,” relying on the Book of the Machine, a
vast technological manual “with instructions against any
possible contingency” to guide their lives. Complaints about
malfunctions were channeled to a Committee on the Mending
Apparatus, which in turn forwarded them to an anonymous
Central Committee, which might or might not respond – or
might retaliate with punishment. But as the original inventors
of the Machine die off, fewer people understand how the Machine
functions. The Mending Apparatus breaks down, and
377. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20–25.
378. Id.
379. Talbott, supra note 369.
380. Chase Gunter, What Does the Internet of Things Mean for Data
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eventually, the Machine itself malfunctions and, without
warning, stops, dooming humankind. Yet one of the characters
observes, “Oh, tomorrow – some fool will start the Machine
again, tomorrow!”
Forster’s cautionary tale is obviously an allegory. It warns
of the loss of privacy and humanity that can occur when human
beings are too dependent on technology to fulfill their needs, and
of the risks to fundamental values when that technology is
poorly understood. His prescient novella encourages us to
remember that we must be the ones to control “the Machine.”
As the Internet of Things becomes more and more pervasive,
it is tempting, and some might say inevitable, to simply cede
individual sovereignty to those who develop and operate the
technology. But through law, regulations, litigation, and
consumer activism, we have the capacity to rewrite “The Book of
the Machine.” And we must.

***

